维基百科:2021年基金会针对中文维基百科的行动/维基媒体基金会声明

维基媒体基金会声明

在基金会开始行动的同时，维基媒体基金会法务部门属下社区稳定及发展组的副主席玛姬·丹尼斯（Maggie Dennis，即User:Mdennis (WMF)）在元维基以及维基媒体邮件列表（Wikimedia-l）中发表有关一系列基金会行动的声明，中文翻译如下（内容复制自meta:Office actions/September 2021 statement/zh）：

“ 各位好，

我是维基媒体基金会法务部门的副总玛姬·丹尼斯（Maggie Dennis），目前专门负责社区稳定及发展（Community Resilience & Sustainability）。此信是为了要向大家说明为了保护全球社区，维基媒体基金会采取的一系列行动。

在此先向各位致歉——这封信内容非常长，且部分内容较为含糊。本信所述之大量议题相当复杂，我会尽量简单总结其中对大家来说可能较不熟悉的信息。在条件允许的情况下，我会尽量回复相关问题，在数个星期之后我们的部门将会举办公听会，到时我们可以更深入的讨论本案相关议题。具体时间和详细消息会于跟工作人员协调好之后，尽快公告于Wikimedia-L和元维基。

也许您们之中许多人已经注意到，最近维基媒体基金会修改了保密协议（Non-disclosure agreements，NDA）政策。在元维基上已经有针对这些政策改变的讨论，我不会在此信中复述相关讨论内容。简而言之，基于潜在威胁的可信信息，维基媒体基金会改变了个人接受保密协议的相关方针。这些安全威胁是有关于对维基媒体的渗透（infiltration）的信息，包括对能够接触个人身份信息以及当选的有影响力人物的职务的威胁。由于担心可能触发我们被警告的相关风险，我们无法预告我们此次的行动——即便是对我们所信任的社区成员（如监管员等）我们也不得不保密。我们立即限制了可能受影响的人士对此类工具的使用权限，并正在与相关用户积极沟通，以核实他们是否确切受到危险。

我想要在此强调我们无意指责因此政策改变而权限受到限制之用户有任何不良企图。上述的渗透有多种渠道。我们既发现有用户为了获取相关权力来刻意试图融入社区——然而他们的最终目的与维基媒体基金会开放知识之目标相左。同时我们也注意到部分受信任的社区成员，可能已成为外部团体利用和伤害的危险目标。这项政策主要为了解决后者，减少相关成员被招募或胁迫的可能性。除了这项政策改变中被除权的用户能获得的个人信息可能被泄露之外，我们相信这些用户中的部分也可能面临危险。

本日，维基媒体基金会已经推出第二阶段的方案着手处理关于渗透的顾虑。我们在两大受到影响的辖区之一内采取行动。在深入调查未获认可的组织“中国大陆维基人（用户组）”（Wikimedians of Mainland China，以下简称WMC）部分成员之相关行为后，我们决定全局禁制7位用户，并将12位管理人员除权。同时，我们向部分编辑者告知了拉票以及人肉搜索的相关政策，要求他们改变行为。

通常来说，维基媒体基金会不会对于自身之行动做过多的解释，但此次破例是因为此次受影响范围之大前所未见。为了保护在特定国家，及未受认可之用户组的用户之隐私及安全，我们无法透露过多消息。我承认这些行动实属激进，然而此决议并非轻易。我们并不想要打击及摧毁那些积极为开放知识奋斗的诚信的包含WMC成员的中国编辑者的努力。我们不希望他们担忧他们的贡献会不受欢迎。可是，我们也不能在明知他们的安全可能遭受威胁的前提下，放任他们暴露在危险之中，而不采取任何保护措施。

在此之前，我们已经限制了对中国大陆地区用户的个人信息存取，我们知悉到上述的威胁存在于我们的项目之中。我们了解到已有用户因此受到人身伤害。在确认案件真实性后，我们不得不立即采取相应措施。

在我的维基生涯里面，此次的事件是一场挑战，同时是一场胜利——维基百科已从一个受怀疑的非主流网站变成了全球高度信任普遍仰仗的网络百科。我在2007年第一次编辑项目时，就觉得维基媒体有成为世界最伟大的成就之潜力：大众的知识唾手可得。这是全体编辑者伟大的善举。但是我在我开始编辑之后很快地意识到在如何呈现信息上的角力之激烈，且有人利用该争端来达成其目的。在此，我并不是要说我有先见之明——我相信有许多维基成员在我之前早就意识到了相应的风险。我相信当今天的维基媒体项目备受信任，而外部势力控制维基媒体信息对他们能带来前所未有的好处的时候，我们面临的风险之大也是前所未有的。

“掌控”社区的威胁是实质存在的。数年来，维基媒体基金会一直知道克罗地亚语维基百科（Croatian Wikipedia）有面临相关的挑战——当中的相关文件可以追溯至近十年前。维基媒体基金会近期设置了打击虚假消息团队，他们在评估相关风险、查找适当的方式、并已聘雇外部研究人员来审查项目的相关资料，以帮助我们更好地理解在面临相似情况时可以使用怎样的解决方案，以及该情境的起因。最近，我们也成立了人权团队，专门处理这些因有组织的控制消息的尝试而造成的紧急人权威胁。我们今天所处理的案件展示了作为一个全球媒体活动，我们多么需要积极地处理面对的威胁，既要保证任何人在任何地方都可以编辑，又要保证这些人免受想让他们噤声的人的伤害。

关于除权，我们希望可以于可见的未来跟国际中文社区作近一步的沟通，探讨我们对于选举制度的项目，以避免相关的维基媒体基金会项目被不合理的控制，并确保人们可以感觉安全并确实安全地编辑维基百科。我们需要确保我们的社区可以举办公正的选举——没有拉票或欺诈的行为。同时，我们希望对于选举制度的改变可以帮助我们恢复（中文维基百科之）用户查核员（CheckUser）权限。

在本信的结尾，我想要对你们当中被惊扰到人被表达我最真挚的歉意。这些人无疑包括那些担心个人信息是否已被泄漏的（我们并不认为有这样的问题。我们已经及时采取行动避免了此事。）以及那些担心更多此类的维基媒体基金会行动可能影响他们正常编辑和他们的社区的用户（我们认为我们目前的行动已经在中短期遏止了相关的风险）。我对于受到相关威胁的社区表示抱歉。维基媒体基金会将继续加强建设，以支持所有需要我们支持的社区，我们也仍然在学习如何能做得更好。同时，我们将继续改进我们在这两方面的认知：我们在人权领域的影响以及我们解决相关挑战的能力。您们值得有更好的服务——我们无法马上解决所有的问题，但我们将积极努力专注地提升改进。

在此，我想要对在全球活跃贡献的为五洲四海的读者服务的四千多名中文维基人表达歉意和遗憾。我向你们保证，我们将会做得更好。您们向在世界各地的中文维基读者分享知识是非常有意义的善举——我们保证会持续支持您们的付出，为您们提供所需工具，使您们在一个安全、有效的环境心想事成。

在此重申，我会在法务团队及其他相关团队的帮助下，尽力回答你们的问题。我们会在元维基上设立一个专页，以讨论此系列的行动，并于几周之后，我会主持公听会，让我们能更深入的讨论本案相关议题。

致以最诚挚的问候， Maggie Dennis (WMF)（留言） 2021年9月13日 (一) 16:13 (UTC) 玛姬

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”

英文原文（内容复制自m:Office actions/September 2021 statement）

“

Hello everyone,

I’m Maggie Dennis, the Wikimedia Foundation’s Vice President of Community Resilience & Sustainability. I’m reaching out to you today to talk about a series of actions the Foundation has recently taken to protect communities across the globe.

I apologize in advance for the length and the ambiguity in certain areas. These are complicated issues, and I will try to summarize a lot of what may be unfamiliar information to some of you succinctly. I will answer questions to the best of my ability within safety parameters, and I will be hosting an office hour in a few weeks where I can discuss these issues in more depth. We’re currently getting that set up in regards to availability of support staff and will announce it on Wikimedia-L and Meta as soon as that information is prepared.

Many of you are already aware of recent changes that the Foundation has made to its NDA policy. These changes have been discussed on Meta, and I won’t reiterate all of our disclosures there, but I will briefly summarize that due to credible information of threat, the Foundation has modified its approach to accepting “non-disclosure agreements” from individuals. The security risk relates to information about infiltration of Wikimedia systems, including positions with access to personally identifiable information and elected bodies of influence. We could not pre-announce this action, even to our most trusted community partner groups (like the stewards), without fear of triggering the risk to which we’d been alerted. We restricted access to these tools immediately in the jurisdictions of concern, while working with impacted users to determine if the risk applied to them.

I want to pause to emphasize that we do not mean to accuse any specific individual whose access was restricted by that policy change of bad intent. Infiltration can occur through multiple mechanisms. What we have seen in our own movement includes not only people deliberately seeking to ingratiate themselves with their communities in order to obtain access and advance an agenda contrary to open knowledge goals, but also individuals who have become vulnerable to exploitation and harm by external groups because they are already trusted insiders. This policy primarily served to address the latter risk, to reduce the likelihood of recruitment or (worse) extortion. We believe that some of the individuals impacted by this policy change were also themselves in danger, not only the people whose personal information they could have been forced to access.

Today, the Foundation has rolled out a second phase of addressing infiltration concerns, which has resulted in sweeping actions in one of the two currently affected jurisdictions. We have banned seven users and desysopped a further 12 as a result of long and deep investigations into activities around some members of the unrecognized group Wikimedians of Mainland China. We have also reached out to a number of other editors with explanations around canvassing guidelines and doxing policies and requests to modify their behaviors.

When it comes to office actions, the Wikimedia Foundation typically defaults to little public communication, but this case is unprecedented in scope and nature. While there remain limits to what we can reveal in order to protect the safety and privacy of users in that country and in that unrecognized group, I want to acknowledge that this action is a radical one and that this decision was not easily made. We struggled with not wanting to discourage and destroy the efforts of good faith users in China who have worked so hard to fight for free and open knowledge, including some of those involved in this group. We do not want them to fear that their contributions are unwelcome. We also could not risk exposing them to danger by doing nothing to protect them after we became aware of credible threats to their safety.

While some time ago we limited the exposure of personal information to users in mainland China, we know that there has been the kind of infiltration we describe above in the project. And we know that some users have been physically harmed as a result. With this confirmed, we have no choice but to act swiftly and appropriately in response.

I take it as both a triumph and a challenge that in the years of my own involvement I have seen Wikimedia go from a suspect non-mainstream website to a highly trusted and widely relied upon source across the world. When I first started editing the projects in about 2007, I already believed Wikimedia had the capacity to be one of the greatest achievements of the world — collective knowledge, at your fingertips. What an amazing gesture of goodwill on the part of all of its many editors. It didn’t take me long after I started editing to realize how entrenched the battles could be over how to present information and how that can be exploited to achieve specific ends. I’m not trying to suggest that I was astonishingly prescient; I think there were many who realized that risk long before I stumbled naively on the scene. I do think that the risk is greater than ever now, when Wikimedia projects are widely trusted, and when the stakes are so high for organized efforts to control the information they share.

Community “capture” is a real and present threat. For years, the movement has been widely aware of challenges in the Croatian Wikipedia, with documentation going back nearly a decade. The Foundation recently set up a disinformation team, which is still finding its footing and assessing the problem, but which began by contracting an external researcher to review that project and the challenges and help us understand potential causes and solutions for such situations. We have also recently staffed a human rights team to deal with urgent threats to the human rights of communities across the group as a result of such organized efforts to control information. The situation we are dealing with today has shown me how much we need as a movement to grapple with the hard questions of how we remain open to editing by anyone, anywhere, while ensuring that individuals who take us up on that offer are not harmed by those who want to silence them.

With respect to the desysopping, we hope to connect with the international Chinese language community in the near future to talk about approaches to elections that avoid the risk of project capture and ensure that people are and feel safe contributing to the Chinese language Wikipedia. We need to make sure that the community can hold fair elections, without canvassing or fraud. We hope that helping to establish such a fair approach to elections will allow us to reinstate CheckUser rights in time.

I want to close this message by noting that I am personally deeply sorry to those of you for whom this will be a shock. This will undoubtedly include those who wonder if they should fear that their personal information has been exposed (we do not believe so; we believe we acted in time to prevent that) and also those who fear that further such bold action is in the works which may disrupt them and their work and their communities (at this point, with this action, we believe the identified risks have been contained in the short to medium term). I am also truly sorry to those communities who have been uneasy in the shadow of such threats for some time. The Foundation continues to build our capacity to support every community that wants or needs its support - and we are still learning how to do so well when we do. One of the key areas we seek improvement is in our ability to understand our human rights impact and in our ability to address those challenges. You have not had the service you’ve deserved. We can’t fix things immediately, but we are working to improve, actively, intentionally, and with focus.

To the 4,000 active Chinese language Wikimedians distributed across the world and serving readers in multiple continents, I would like to communicate my sorrow and regret. I want to assure you that we will do better. The work you do in sharing knowledge to Chinese readers everywhere has great meaning, and we are committed to supporting you in doing this work into the future, with the tools you need to succeed in a safe, secure, and productive environment.

Again, I will answer what questions I can, also relying on the support of others in Legal and perhaps beyond. We’re setting up a page on Meta to talk, and I will be hosting an office hour in coming weeks.

Best regards, Maggie Dennis (WMF) (talk) 16:13, 13 September 2021 (UTC) Maggie

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”

第一次问答

玛姬·丹尼斯在2021年9月14日 (二) 20:16 (UTC)于元维基声明页的讨论页中发表了一个问答，回应了六条问题。以下采用User:卡达在2021年9月15日 (三) 04:12 (UTC)在互助客栈消息区发布（固定版本）的翻译版本，并有少量修订。

“

1. 基金会是从何时开始意识到这个风险，而这风险又持续了多久？

   虽然我们收到了许多志愿者所提出的相关问题、投诉与担忧，但这些投诉、问题与担忧最少可以追溯到2017年，但我们从近一年开始非常认真的调查，因为很明显的，社区成员的初期干预导致无法安全地解决问题。

2. NDA政策的改变与基金会行动有何关系？

   保密协议（NDA）的政策调整停止对住在维基计划途径遭封禁地区志愿者的保密协议承认，理由相信这些用户有关的地址为个人申请者及基金会所知悉。这是由最近世界所引发的事件，这起事件是由可信消息所引发的，这些事件使得维基媒体社区面临更为集中的安全威胁，并使多名志愿者曝于危险之中。

   安全风险与维基媒体系统渗透的消息有关，包括有权访问个人身份消息的职位和选举产生影响的组织。这代表着我们无法预先宣布我们的行动，但不必担心触发我们所警示的风险。我们在相关司法管辖区内立即限制对于这些工具的访问，同时对于受影响的用户采取合作以确定相关风险会否影响到他们。这是由于并非所有该受到政策变化而遭到限制访问的个人都有不良意图。

   政策的改变是解决保持社区安全的迫切需求的第一步。第二步是与受影响的用户获取联系，并与监管员合作制定受影响账户表达的偏好，以响应个人的保密协议。

   只有在立即完成填补此安全漏洞的步骤后，我们才会开始去结束对可能参与其中的社区成员的调查。这两者之间在很多方面都有所关连，但不是每个环节都有关连。对于中国的调查是在安全风险的审查与应对之前展开的，因此确实存在超出此范围的问题。

3. 社区成员的个人消息会否曝光？

   我们没有任何证据表明发生了技术性漏洞。关于修正保密协议的第一个行动的主旨是防止那些容易被国家行动的人或是其他从技术上获取其他用户私人消息并对其识别、利用或控制而对于消息控制感到兴趣的人。由于我们的软件会追踪这些消息被访问的时间，因此我们没有任何理由相信这些信息是以这种方式访问的。始终存在一个问题，即志愿者向其他志愿者透露了多少消息，包括通过私人电子邮箱和聚会。我希望我们生活在一个每个人都可以被视为表面价值和善意可信的世界中，但尽管“善意推定”是维基媒体社区工作的关键方法，但这不会也不应该立即上纲到共享个人消息。在不久的未来，我希望我们能够加强我们的集体工作，帮助人们更好地了解他们共享的内容、与谁共享的风险以及如何在数码环境中安全地管理他们的私人消息。与此同时，我鼓励每个关心自身安全的维基媒体人访问元维基上的“Voices under Threat”页面：https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Voices_under_Threat 。此页面收集了一些可能有帮助的资源。

4. 社区是否允许被除权的用户再次RfA？否需要（强制性）改革RfA机制以举办未来的 RfA，包括但不限于那些被除权的人？

   这些个人被除权的原因有许多，诸如有证据表明选举是有偏见的，个人被迫使（例如在 QQ 或其他非维基的平台威胁）而投票，以及有证据表明滥用站务工具支持该组织某些被禁制成员的活动。这些活动包含肉搜、骚扰、共享账号和跨维基协调。然而这些人知道或理解该团体的某些成员所做的事情，并非一无所知，并且取消管理权限是根据基金会行动政策的次要基金会行动条款，基金会不反对本地社区可以决定公平地重新选举。考虑到团体活动及对于反对者的人身威胁，我们认为社区应优先改革 RfA 机制，与此同时，我们准备通过以往过去所观察到的选举模式，对任何此类的选举进行复核，以提供支持。

5. 受NDA（保密协议）政策更改影响的用户是否最终能够恢复其账号？

   是的，尽管我不清楚过程是否已经完成。有鉴于威胁的程度，我们认为最好是在我们单独连系他们的同时，关闭他们在服务端的访问，以确保社区和用户自身的安全。所有用户都可以自行删除访问的权限，有些用户也已经这样做了。一些用户希望就撤销其保密协议提出申诉，我们的法律人员一直在信任与安全（Trust & Safety）的支持下审查这些申诉，以确定是否可以恢复更高级别的访问权限。用户账号已被解锁，是因为他们的访问权限已被正式撤销（通过自我请求或基金会流程）或他们的NDA申诉成功。

   考虑到这个问题，我们不打算透露哪些用户申诉成功。这样做可能会增加这些人的危险。当然，欢迎他们表明自己的身份，但我鼓励他们根据自己的风险状况考虑是否可以安全地这样做。

   我也不打算讨论因NDA政策更改而删除访问权限的个人，但要注意的是，这些不是在云端删除的。

6. WMCUG（WMC用户组）仍然举办公[开]活动，包括编辑松和新闻服务[。]一些全局封禁的用户目前控制着WMCUG以及QQ文字频道等线下社交媒体平台。只要这组织仍然遵循全局封禁的控制着这些用户，是否应该将其根除？

   这是一个很难回答的问题，我觉得我难以完美回应，基金会多年来一直从事信任与安全（Trust & Safety）行动，但并非所有行动都得到社区普遍的支持。有些行动如此；但有些却引起争议。多年前，面对一个在某个社区引起争议的禁令，基金会采取了一项政策，即基金会对于被封禁的账号通过“代理”来编辑，亦有可能会对其封禁。通常，我们会警告人们，但这取决于当前情势中固有的风险。

   我们目前并不打算取消WMCUG的站内页面，尽管我确实认为我们有必要把集结成一个非正式团体的一些困境视为一场运动。这些都是被允许的，甚至我认为是个好主意。它降低了参与和组织的障碍。然而，如果这些非正式组织通过维基媒体的网站向其他人暗示，他们以他们不被认可和授权的方式而被认可和授权，可能会引起人们对滥用的担忧。

   我们希望WMCUG的其余编辑，包括那些被警告的编辑，注意到这次的行动，并重新考虑他们如何与我们社区中的其他人展开合作。在某些情况之下，我们认为某些用户可能并未完全了解正在发生的事情。我强烈怀疑某些用户可能需要一段时间来反思这些行动，并确定他们如何最好地实现运动的目的，而不会出现过去的问题。

   至于用户组页面，我们将继续观察我们网站上的页面，以了解是否需要就他们可能的对他们扭曲的从属关系或对遭禁制的用户进行代理的行为采取行动。

”

英文原文（经格式修订）

“

1. When was the Foundation aware of this risk and how long has this lasted?

   While we have received related questions, complaints, and concerns from other volunteers dating back to at least 2017, we have been investigating these concerns very seriously for nearly a year, as it became obvious that some early interventions by community members were not going to resolve the issue safely.

2. What is the connection between the NDA Policy Change and the recent Office Actions?

   The non-disclosure agreement (NDA) policy adjustment suspended recognition of NDAs from volunteer applicants who live in jurisdictions that have blocked access to Wikimedia projects and where there was reason to believe that the domicile associated with the user accounts were known to others than the individual applicant(s) and the Foundation. This was necessitated by recent world events triggered by credible information about a more focused security threat to the Wikimedia community that placed multiple volunteers at risk.

   The security risk related to information about infiltration of Wikimedia systems, including positions with access to personally identifiable information and elected bodies of influence. This meant that we could not pre-announce our action, without fear of triggering the risk to which we had been alerted. We restricted access to these tools immediately in the jurisdictions of concern, while working with impacted users to determine if the risk applied to them. This is because not all individuals whose access was restricted by that policy change, had bad intent.

   The policy change was a first step to address the immediate needs of keeping the community safe. The second step was to get in touch with the impacted users and to work with the Stewards to enact the preferences expressed by impacted accounts in response to individual non-public outreach.

   Only after this immediate step to close this security gap was complete did we commence to conclude the investigations into individual community members who may have been involved. The two actions are related in many ways, but not in every point. The Chinese investigation precedes that security risk review and response and does have issues that go beyond it.

3. Has private information of community members been exposed?

   We have no evidence that any technical breach occurred. The first action on changing the NDA policy was intended to prevent technical access to private information about other users by those who could be easily identified, located, and exploited whether by state actors or others with an interest in controlling information. Since our software tracks when such information is accessed, we do not have any reason to believe that this information was accessed in such a manner.

   There is always a question of how much information volunteers release themselves to other volunteers, including over private email and in meet-ups. I wish we lived in a world where everyone could be taken at face value and good intentions trusted, but while “assume good faith” is a key approach to working in Wikimedia communities, it does not and should not immediately extend to sharing personal information. In the near future, I hope we will be able to increase our collective work towards helping people better understand the risks of what they share and with whom and how to manage their private information safely in a digital environment. In the meantime, I would encourage every Wikimedian who is concerned about their own security to drop by the Voices Under Threat page on Meta: https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Voices_under_Threat. This page collects some resources that may help.

4. Is the community allowed to hold RfAs for those removed of their advanced rights? Is reformation of the RfA system required (compulsory) for holding future RFAs, including or at least for those who were desysopped?

   The individual desyoppings took place for a number of reasons, including evidence of biased elections where individuals were pressured (sometimes with off-wiki threats on QQ and other platforms) to vote as they did and evidence of misuse of administrative tools to support the aims and activities of some of the banned members of the group. Activities include doxing, harassment, sharing accounts, and off-wiki coordination. However, it is not always clear how much these individuals knew or understood about what some of the members of that group were doing, and the Foundation does not object under the Secondary Office Actions provision of the Office Action Policy, on removal of advanced rights, to the community determining to fairly re-elect them. Considering that evidence evaluated of the groups’ activities includes physical coercion of volunteers who opposed the group, we do believe it would be better for the community to reform the RfA system first, but in the meantime we are prepared to support by reviewing any such elections against the patterns observed in prior elections.

5. Were users affected by the NDA policy change ultimately able to recover their accounts?

   Yes, although I am not sure if that process is fully complete. Given the nature of the threat, we felt it best secured the safety of the communities and the users themselves to shut down their access on the server-side while we contacted them individually. All users were offered the option to remove their access on their own accord, and some did so. Some users wished to request an appeal of the revocation of their NDA, and our Legal staff have been reviewing those appeals with the support of Trust & Safety to determine if higher levels of access could be restored. User accounts have been unlocked as their access has been formally withdrawn (either through self-request or Foundation process) or as their NDA appeal has been successful.

   In anticipation of the question, we do not intend to name the users whose appeals were successful. Doing so could increase the jeopardy of these individuals. They are welcome, of course, to identify themselves, but I would encourage them to consider whether they can do so safely, based on their own risk profiles.

   I am also not going to discuss the individuals whose access was removed by the NDA policy change except to note that their removal is not under a cloud.

6. The WMCUG still hosts public events, including editathons and news services as some globally banned user(s) are currently in control of WMCUG along with off-site social media platforms like QQ text channels. Should these organizations be removed from on-site exposure as long as they are still in control of such users to comply with global bans?

   This is a hard question, and I suspect I will not answer it perfectly. The Foundation has engaged in trust & safety activities for years, not all of which receive universal community support. Some do; some are very controversial. Years ago, in the face of a ban that was controversial in one community, the Foundation adopted a policy that users who edit by “proxy” on behalf of Foundation banned accounts may also be banned. Typically, we try to warn people, but it depends on the risks inherent in the situation at hand.

   It is not our current intention to eliminate the on-site page for WMCUG, although I do believe that it will be necessary for us to consider as a movement some of the hard questions around the formation of informal groups. These are allowed, and in my opinion that is a very good idea. It lowers the barrier to participation and organization. It can, however, raise concerns about misuse if such an informal group uses Wikimedia’s sites to suggest to others that they are recognized and authorized in ways they are not.

   It is our hope that the remaining editors of WMCUG, including those warned, will take heed of this action and reconsider how they work with others in our communities collaboratively. In some cases, we believe some users may not have been fully aware of what was going on. I strongly suspect that some users may need a period of time to reflect on these actions and determine how they can best move forward with the goals of the movement without the problems of the past.

   As to the user group pages, we will continue to watch the ones on our sites to understand if action is necessary if they seem to misrepresent their affiliation or to be proxying for banned users.

”

第二次问答

玛姬·丹尼斯在2021年9月15日 (三) 18:48 (UTC)于元维基声明页的讨论页中发表了第二次问答，回应了五条问题。以下采用User:Antigng在2021年9月16日 (四) 16:26 (UTC)在基金会行动本地主论坛发布（固定版本）的翻译版本。

“

1. 七笔禁制理由都很“常规”么？（“常规”是指仅涉及社区公认基金会信任与安全团队有管辖权的事宜（而非纯粹本地社区事务，译者注），如暴力威胁等严重（不当）行为。）

   对。首先，您已然意识到笔者可能不能如您所愿，非常详细地解答您的疑惑，对此笔者不胜感激。（原提问即标题，提问人没有问具体的禁制理由，而是问禁制理由“常规”与否，表明其意识到了基金会不可能透露具体的禁制理由。译者注）就着您的问题，笔者解释一下个中原因。当我们谈论基金会行动时，有一系列因素需要平衡。（一方面，）需要确保受害者的安全。如果我们透露的（基金会）行动原因（详细到）足以令威胁、起底、骚扰等（不当行为）的受害者被轻而易举地发现，则我们可能会加剧他们遭受的伤害。（另一方面，）需确保社区知悉我们的决定是基于合理的理由。我们希望（维基）人在参与维基媒体计划时能有安全感，而不必担忧什么“非本地的权威机构”会突然强力介入并开展不公正的行动。笔者也是人类社会的一分子；笔者所在的地方，当局的行动——在笔者看来——也非全然公正。故笔者完全能理解维系（权威机构与个人间，译者注）信任的重要性。（此外，）还需避免被（基金会行动）制裁者遭打击报复。这个问题很复杂也引伸出更多的考虑因素。笔者参与领导的任何团队的成员都将一基本原则牢记在心，那就是，所有案件的参与者都是人，有基本人类尊严的人。笔者认为基金会《生者传记决议》原则上对受基金会禁制的个人也应适用。毕竟我们（基金会）不是司法机关。法理上，我们确实有权禁制个人参与（维基媒体）计划；但另一方面，依笔者的“不拙之见”，我们也有在社区需要我们（出手）时执行禁制的道义责任。这种需求有时是由于情势过于危险本地社区难以干预，或是情况过于复杂以至本地制度无法解决。（若为执行《通用行为准则》需成立全局机构，笔者亦希望社区成员能参与合作。）“（基金会）不是司法机关”这一现状给我们带来了很多挑战：我们无法强制搜证，也无法保护举报人、目击证人和“陪审员”免受他人胁迫或报复，更无法避免被举报人遭“私力救济”。从社会意义上说，对他人的不当行为的批评指责乃遏制不当行为的强有力工具，但同时它又是一把“双刃剑”：我们对他人在维基媒体计划上（不当）行为的（指控）意见，可能会伴随他们终生；即使他们犯事时尚年幼、为生活所迫或遭困扰，即使他们日后改过自新（，该种指控仍可能成为其挥之不去的污点）。（笔者认为《当你被公开羞辱》即便不是一部关于如何更好地应对此类问题的指南，也至少是一本发人深思的读物。）

   （遵循基金会所咨询的律所（非受聘于基金会的法律人员）给出的法律建议，）笔者已然在本案中公开远多于过往的（基金会行动）案件中我们所能公开的内容。其中一个原因在于，本案涉案人数之多、活动之广，令笔者得以在不过分针对任何个人的前提下，或多或少地归纳概述案情（并公开发布）。话虽如此，笔者在此向大家赌誓：所有（基金会全局）禁制所针对的行为，皆被包括英文社区在内（大量英文社区成员反对基金会扩权，译者注）的（全体）社区视为基金会管辖权以内的事宜。本案的材料经过基金会两个法律团队的审视；最终的禁制决定亦“不可申诉”，因其属于以下条款描述的情形："Excluded cases are those conducted because of statutory, regulatory, employment, or legal policies as defined by Foundation attorneys."（出自Trust and Safety/Case Review Committee；换言之，本案中遭禁制用户不可上诉至信任与安全案件审查委员会，译者注）。“人身伤害”四个字岂是随口一言？此乃基金会信任与安全团队（的工作）中极少遇到情形；一旦遇到，我们必将严肃对待。

   至于本案中被除权的管理员和遭行为警告的用户是否允许申诉，基金会内部确有分歧。虽然传统上此类案件均允许申诉，但目前基金会法律团队不认为该种申诉可行：该案的材料并非每名涉事者单独一份，而是盘根错节的几百页资料。对于遭行为警告的用户而言，行为警告非明面上的制裁；是否以及何时将遭受行为警告之用户在基金会内部留档以供日后其申请基金会资源（如奖金和拨款）时审视，也是过去困扰我们的一个问题。一名最近被基金会行为警告的社区成员向我们反映，（被警告者）们在维基媒体计划上的贡献会遭不公平的过分审视；据此，我们调整了应对上述问题的策略。（我们会不断学习与改进，即使是被基金会制裁的个人给我们的反馈意见也可能对我们有所帮助。当然，受基金会全局禁制者例外，依《全局禁制方针》基金会不予此类人沟通。）对于被除权的管理员而言，经相关社区同意他们亦可复职。当下，基金会信任与安全团队的全球负责人（指Jan，译者注）正与中文社区开展积极主动的对话沟通，探讨如何在中国大陆内外对（尤其是发生在意见不和的社区志愿者间）报复和胁迫的担忧仍存在的情况下，安全地开展（管理员选举/复职）。

2. 基金会是否认为部分/相当多涉案编者充当了中（华人民共和）国政府的代理人？

   早前已有记者向笔者询问过类似问题；笔者并未承诺向该记者提供独家消息。故，在此处转述早前的回复，作为笔者对该问题的回答：“我无意指责中（华人民共和）国，亦尚未掌握能驱使我作出如此指责的情报资讯。我甚至不确定这些个人受（北京，译者注）影响是出于自愿或否。某种意义上说，我之所以会（持这样的立场），是因为我自己就是一名维基人，也不希望数据被强行引申解读。本想（把以下内容）删掉的，但我还是在这里给你举个例子：如果你问我，2021年美国国会暴动案是否为美国政府（或受其影响的个人）所为，我同样难以直接回答你的问题。是？否？有可能是？说到底，（这类事件的肇因）是那些认为自己有权通过作恶或开展争议行为向他人施压，以满足自身需求的人。这类问题不是中（华人民共和）国（特色）的问题，也不是美国（特色）的问题。它们是人（性）的问题，是在这个‘战线’无处不在、真假消息纷飞的时代，我们会越来越频繁地参与处理的问题。”（笔者在提交（编辑时）没把这段话删掉。就当是拿自己的国家引战吧。）

3. 基金会有否考虑过（本次基金会行动）可能在中文社区引起的“寒蝉效应”？

   当然考虑过，这正是我们在决定如何行动之时所考虑的最困难的因素。老实说，无论我们如何开展行动，“寒蝉效应”都会存在。虽然笔者还是想避免讨论（受基金会行动影响的）特定个人的行为，在此仍试举一例：公开记录显示这其中有一部分用户存在针对香港的中文社区成员的行为。公开记录所示的以上行为明显能诱发“寒蝉效应”。而（WMC）用户组成员开展的“寒蝉”行为不止于此，其中一些的对象则是中国（大陆）社区志愿者。如上方的回答中所述，笔者认为对强力的权威机构本身的恐惧就有可能带来“寒蝉效应”。（指第一个问题的回答中“希望（维基）人在参与维基媒体计划时能有安全感”的部分，译者注）笔者在此开诚布公地探讨“寒蝉效应”，其中一个原因是笔者希望这样做可以部分缓和（该效应的负面影响）。笔者已竭尽所能透露我们行动的细节及原因，望大家理解。考量基金会行动对社区日常发展的影响，并在出现问题的情形下及时加以修补，也是笔者的职责所在。包括中文社区在内的部分维基社区成员在为我们的站点作出贡献的同时又要被迫应对上述行为，同时我们体系的缺陷也令以平稳的方式应对相关情况成为不可能。对此，笔者亦有愧。但现实就是，欲维护安全就必须让人们知悉危险之所在，分享（过多）信息有时也是冒险之举。笔者真心希望大家不要因相关消息而受“寒蝉效应”困扰；请大家振作起来，评估有关安全风险，与我们和其它社区成员通力合作，共同守卫彼此的安全。我们团队（指基金会信任与安全团队，译者注）和基金会人权团队将致力于探索实现这一目标之路。

4. 第八名（被禁制）用户User:玄客未列于基金会全局禁制列表（见此，译者注）。我们调查了该用户的编辑倾向，发现其与其它七名被禁制用户皆不吻合。请问为何该用户会被禁制？（该用户是谁的傀儡/真人傀儡？）

   对于特定的禁制案，笔者只能透露以下信息：这一连串基金会行动涉及庞杂的站外证据和技术证据。所有被执行禁制的账户，要么是被指认为（列于禁制列表上的）个人的傀儡账户，要么就是被指认为他们的主账户。错认用户有可能发生；这也是我们会向受（禁制）影响的账户本人提供邮箱cawikimedia.org的其中一个原因。如账户设置了邮件地址，我们便会通过（站内电邮）与之获取联络；有时候我们只能在他们的用户页留言通知。笔者亦请大家注意，本次基金会行动涉及有史以来在短时间内执行的最大规模的批量禁制。如果经与（被禁制）用户的沟通联络，我们发现有证据表明禁制决定有误，则我们将撤销禁制，（在有关页面）做出注解解释原因，并公开向用户道歉。

5. 关于WMC用户组，我认为基金会有必要回应他们声明中的一些牢骚话（原用户问题如此，指《丢掉幻想，准备斗争——一评基金会全局锁定中文维基人及玛吉·丹尼斯的“声明”》，译者注），并出示相应证据。

   两点：

   一，WMC用户组并非受基金会承认的维基团体。在别处笔者也已指出（见上一组FAQ中第六个问题，译者注），（允许未受承认的用户组）是好事，因为它降低了参与组织社区活动的门槛。然而，未受承认的用户组并未签署有关协议（包括行为守则），基金会不能赋予其附属团体的地位。笔者有意愿与（WMC）用户组内其它未被禁制的个人展开对话，正如笔者与大家展开对话一样。但笔者不会通读（WMC）用户组的通讯记录——特别是在有关记录涉及到被禁制的个人或其代理人的情况下。笔者会尽其所能向询问者提供模糊的信息；但依基金会方针，笔者不会与被禁制用户对话，亦不会与通过非（由基金会）控制的通信渠道自行联络我们的用户对话。

   二，虽然基金会未公开其内部调查报告，多年来已有若干维基人发布了大量关于（WMC）用户组及其活动的相关的证据。在此为大家列出若干，例如以下发表在英文维基刊物《The Signpost》上，由一受承认维基团体的成员（指香港用户组的User:1233，译者注）提供的信息，该员今天仍在邮件列表Wikimedia-L支持中文维基媒体计划：en:Wikipedia:Wikipedia Signpost/2019-10-31/In focus、en:Wikipedia:Wikipedia Signpost/2021-07-25/Special report，笔者未见案件材料与上述记录有矛盾之处。

”

英文原文（经格式修订）

“

1. Were the reasons for all seven bans "conventional" reasons (eg, threats of violence or other serious actions of types that the community has accepted as belonging to T&S)?

   First, Yair, I’m grateful for your recognition that I probably can’t answer these questions as fully as you would like. :) That you asked allows me to explain why. When we talk about Office Actions, there are a number of factors we have to balance. There is safety to the victims. If by discussing the cause of an action we make it easy to identify a victim of threats, doxing, harassment or other causes, we can compound any harm they’ve suffered. There is the need to reassure communities that we have made a decision for valid cause. We want people to feel safe on Wikimedia, including safe from some distant authority who may swoop in out of the blue and take unfair action. As a human living in the human world where authorities’ actions do not always seem just to me, I completely understand how important that trust is to maintain. There is also a need to avoid inflicting harm to the people who have been sanctioned. This one is complex, but it arises from multiple factors. Any team on which I myself have direct influence will never forget that everyone involved in these cases is a person, deserving of basic human dignity. I believe that the biographies of living persons resolution should in principle apply even to Foundation banned individuals. We are not, after all, a court of law. We do have a legal authority to ban individuals from participating in our projects and, in my not humble opinion, a moral duty to do so when the community needs us to. That can happen when situations are too dangerous for communities to intervene or when situations are more complex than a local community has systems to resolve. (If a global body is created as part of UCoC enforcement, I hope to have community partners on that side of things.) Not being a court of law increases some of our challenges. We do not have the ability to compel evidence; to protect complainants, witnesses, or ‘juries’ (to use a metaphor) from coercion or retaliation; or to protect those who are complained against from vigilante justice (to stick with the same metaphor). Socially speaking, calling people out for bad behavior is a powerful tool to help avoid bad behavior, but it is also a very dangerous one. What we say about people’s behavior on our projects can follow them forever, even if they are young, even if they were going through a hard time, even if they were frustrated, and even if they correct their behaviors in the future. (I found So You’ve Been Publicly Shamed a really thought-provoking read, even if not a handbook for how to do this better.)

   One of the reasons I requested to speak far more publicly about this case than we are usually able to do (under legal guidance from a firm who advised the Foundation, not the Foundation’s attorneys themselves) was because this case involves enough people and distributed enough activities that I hoped to be able to generalize somewhat without pointing too firmly at any one person. That said, I am going to go out on a limb and say that I have full confidence that all individuals who were banned were banned for the kinds of behavior that communities (including English) widely regard as within the Foundation’s remit. The case file was reviewed by two of the Foundation’s attorneys and the bans have been marked as “unappealable.” This is because they fall into this categorization: “Excluded cases are those conducted because of statutory, regulatory, employment, or legal policies as defined by Foundation attorneys.” I did not mention “physical harm” lightly. This is something that we see very rarely in Trust & Safety, but it is always serious when we do.

   We did wrestle with the question of whether to open up the desysops and conduct warnings for appeal, as traditionally such cases may be open to appeal. At this point, the Foundation’s attorneys do not believe that it is doable, because the evidence file on this case is not defined by individual, but an intertwined conglomeration of hundreds of pages of material. The conduct warnings are not visible sanctions; we have struggled in the past with whether and when conduct-warned individuals should be flagged internally for review when receiving Foundation resources (like scholarships and grants), and based on feedback from a community member who was recently warned that they found their work in the movement unfairly scrutinized, we have modified this approach. (We continue to try to learn and improve, and feedback even from sanctioned individuals is helpful - although by policy we will not communicate with those who are globally banned). Those desysopped can be restored if the involved community chooses to restore their access, and our global head of Trust & Safety is actively and openly speaking with the Chinese community about best practices to conduct that review safely, given retaliation and coercion concerns especially for unaligned volunteers in mainland China itself, but also beyond.

2. Does the WMF believe that some/many of the involved contributors have been acting as agents of the Chinese government?

   Since we did not promise an exclusive, I am going to say here what I said to a reporter who reached out with that question: “I am not in position to point fingers at the Chinese State nor in possession of information that would lead me to do so. I can’t even say with certainty whether individuals are influenced willingly or otherwise. In part, that is because I am a Wikimedian myself and am loath to extrapolate more from data than it actually says. I will probably self-censor this before I mail it, but to give you an example, if you asked me if the US Capitol invasion in January 2021 was the US State (or individuals acting under its influence), I would struggle equally to answer you. Yes? No? Maybe? At the end of the day, it is people who believe that they have the right to do bad or questionable things to exert power over others in order to get what they want. It is not a Chinese problem or a US problem, but a human problem, and one we will increasingly be called upon to deal with as information and misinformation are the frontline of conflict everywhere.” (I didn’t self-censor before I sent it out. Picking fights with my own country, I suppose.)

3. Has the Foundation considered the chilling effect this might have on the Chinese community?

   Absolutely, and that has been the hardest part about determining how to act. To be frank, I see that regardless of what we do, there will be a chilling effect. While I am still avoiding publicly speaking about the actions of specific individuals, there is a substantial published record of concerns about the behavior of some of these individuals towards Chinese users in Hong Kong, for instance. The actions described in that published record have a distinctly chilling effect. These are not the only chilling actions taken by members of this group, some of which have impacted mainland Chinese volunteers as well. I spoke in an answer above about my recognition that fear of draconian authority can also have a chilling effect. One of the reasons that I have come out to speak about this so openly is with the hope of mitigating that chilling effect. I wanted people to understand, as much as I could reveal, what we have done and why.

   It is part of my professional responsibility to think about how Foundation actions impact the ability of our volunteer communities to thrive in their daily activities and to recover quickly when things go wrong. I regret knowing that some members of our Chinese community and beyond are forced to reckon with such activities in relation to their work on our sites and also regret that our systems have not been fully structured to deal with such situations smoothly and easily. However, the reality is that keeping people safe means letting them know where there is danger, and the sharing of information can in some circumstances be a risky act. I really hope individuals will not feel chilled by this knowledge so much as better prepared to assess those risks and work with us and with each other to secure our mutual safety. Figuring out how to do this is one of our commitments with our human rights lead and team.

4. The 8th user, User:玄客, has been WMF-banned without announcement. We investigated their edit pattern, and found no connection with the other seven announced ones. Would you please explain why this user was banned (i.e whose sock/provy they are)?

   All I can say about individual cases is that this series of office actions involved considerable off-wiki and technical evidence. All banned accounts were either identified as socks of one of the named users or was the named user themselves. In such cases, it is always possible that there might be a case of misidentification and that is one of the reasons why users impacted are always reached out to personally through cawikimedia.org. When an email address is identified with an account, we reach out via email. In some cases, we can only leave a note on their user pages. I will also note that this is the largest batch of bans ever launched in a narrow time window, and if our outreach to the user results in evidence that we have made the ban in error, we will reverse it, annotate why, and publicly apologize.

5. With respect to WMCUG, I do think some of their grievances in their response should be addressed and evidence be shown.

   There are two factors here.

   First, the WMCUG is not a recognized body in the Wikimedia movement. I have noted elsewhere I think it is a good idea that we make it so simple for people to gather and organize, but unofficial groups have not signed certain agreements (including conduct codes) that would give them affiliate status. I am willing to speak to individuals who have not been banned as I am to all of you here, but I am not reading communications from the group as whole, especially that include or proxy for banned individuals. I try to give information agnostic as to inquirer, but by policy staff do not communicate with banned users or those who contact us on their behalf outside of legally-supervised channels.

   Second, while the Foundation does not publish details of its internal investigation, there has been a substantial body of evidence published about members of this group and its activities by Wikimedians for years. I would refer communities to some of those, such as those shared in English Wikipedia's Signpost by a recognized affiliate that supports the Chinese language projects in a Wikimedia-L thread today: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Wikipedia_Signpost/2019-10-31/In_focus, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Wikipedia_Signpost/2021-07-25/Special_report. Nothing in the case files I have seen contradicts the truthfulness of those accounts.

”

有关User:玄客的公开声明

在基金会行动中，User:玄客为该轮行动中被全局锁定的用户之一。经报告后，基金会于2021年9月16日 (四) 21:47 (UTC)在元维基的原声明页发布一则有关User:玄客的公开声明，表示经调查后发现为错误封禁并致歉。该用户账号于2021年9月17日 (五) 05:12 (UTC)解除锁定（日志：m:43359576）。

“ 基于信任与安全团队通过ca@频道所得的最新信息，我们重新审视了一个因此案而被锁定的账号。该账号属于用户玄客。我们经收到的信息和证据经调查人员查证后，确认玄客并非如原先判断为（被全局禁制用户）Walter Grassroot的傀儡账号。因此，玄客的账号已被完全恢复。

我们感谢所有通过ca@频道发送额外信息和证据以反证我们近期的基金会行动的用户。这是一个非常重要的过程，而基金会会审视每一个用户提供的电邮和文件。

我们在此向用户玄客致以深切歉意，同时在此呼吁用户通过ca@频道向我们提供更多信息。

”

英文原文

“

Upon recent information provided through our ca@ channel within Trust and Safety, we have reassessed one account locked as a result of this investigation. This account belongs to user 玄客. The information and supporting evidence received and authenticated by our investigators ascertains that user 玄客 is not, as originally identified, a sock of Walter Grassroot. As a result of this, user 玄客's account has been restored to full capacity.

We appreciate everyone who is using ca@ channel to send us additional information and evidence that substantiates or refutes the recently undertaken Office Action. This is an important part of the process, and the Foundation is reviewing each email and documents provided.

We offer our unreserved apologies to user 玄客, and we request anyone with additional information to share it through ca@.

”

维基百科创始人吉米·威尔士的个人意见

请留意以下内容并非基金会声明的一部分，仅代表吉米·威尔士之个人看法。如有疑问请参阅WP:老大如是说的谬论。

维基百科的创办人：吉米·威尔士
时任维基媒体基金会的荣誉主席，但在此次行动中并没有参与决策

2021年9月17日，User:Assifbus在维基百科和维基媒体基金会共同创始人吉米·威尔士（Jimmy Wales，即User:Jimbo Wales）的英文维基百科用户讨论页上发表了对此次基金会行动的意见，同日吉米·威尔士作出了回应。以下前两段采用User:Antigng在2021年9月18日 (六) 05:55 (UTC)在基金会行动本地主论坛发布（固定版本）的翻译版本，并有少量修订及第三段自行翻译，摘录如下：

“

对我而言，维基百科最重要的支柱之一就是中立性。（在维基百科上，）来自中国大陆的编者与来自台湾、香港乃至世界各地的编者一样受到欢迎。不受欢迎的是通过有组织的活动操纵议题及噤声他人的企图——无论这种企图来自哪一方。

我能理解以行为不当和操纵议题为由将一批用户逐出门外可能引起（社区的）不安——事实当然如此。但惟有如此，方能确保（日后）公开、公正、不偏不倚的争论得以开展，维基百科得以描述事实，坚持可靠来源，不辜负这些年来我们所珍视和坚守的理念。

了解我在这里的角色也很重要——我并不直接做出或参与这类决定。我不是（基金会）总执行长（CEO），我只是我自己。我认为我的职责主要是提醒每个人——（包括）员工、编者、读者、每一个人——我们的价值观，并坦率地谈论我们都在努力实现的目标。

” ——Jimbo Wales（留言） 2021年9月17日 (五) 18:01 (UTC)

英文原文

“

For me, one of the most important pillars of Wikipedia is neutrality. Editors from mainland China are welcomed, as are editors from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and all around the world. What is not welcomed is organized efforts to push an agenda and silence others - from any side.

I can understand that the removal of a group of editors for misbehavior and agenda pushing can cause turmoil - of course it does. But it is the first step to ensuring that fair, open, and neutral discussions and debates can be had to ensure that Wikipedia speaks the truth, adheres to reliable sources, and lives up to the values that have nourished and sustained us for all these years.

It is also important to understand my role here - I don't directly make or get involved with such decisions. I am not the CEO, I am only me. I view my responsibility as mainly to remind everyone - staff, editors, readers, everyone - of our values and to speak plainly about what we are all trying to achieve.

” ——Jimbo Wales (talk) 18:01, 17 September 2021 (UTC)