用戶:王桁霽/沙盒己

烏鴉行動
印度尼西亞獨立革命的一部分
自左上圖順時針順序 荷軍進入日惹 荷軍向東爪哇進軍 恩基布路克站內建立的軍營 在打巴奴里巡邏的荷蘭士兵走過一排巴塔克民居 在蘇門答臘巴東行軍的荷蘭士兵 蘭陶帕拉帕主要街道上的荷蘭士兵
日期 1948年12月19日—1949年1月5日 (1948-12-19 – 1949-01-05) 地點 印度尼西亞爪哇島與蘇門答臘島 結果 Dutch victory Yogyakarta captured by the Dutch Indonesian government exiled Guerrilla warfare continued
參戰方
印度尼西亞	荷蘭
指揮官與領導者
Sudirman Djatikoesoemo Abdul Haris Nasution	Simon Hendrik Spoor Dirk van Langen
參戰單位
Indonesian Army Kodam I/Bukit Barisan Kodam III/Siliwangi Kodam IV/Diponegoro Kodam V/Brawijaya 印度尼西亞空軍	Royal Netherlands East Indies Army Royal Netherlands East Indies Army Air Force Korps Speciale Troepen Government Navy Royal Netherlands Army Grenadiers' and Rifles Guard Regiment Garderegiment Fuseliers Prinses Irene 1st Regiment Infantry (1 RI) 9th Regiment Infantry (9 RI) Regiment Infanterie Oranje Gelderland Regiment Limburgse Jagers Regiment Stoottroepen Prins Bernhard Royal Netherlands Air Force Royal Netherlands Navy Mariniersbrigade
兵力
3架零式艦上戰鬥機 100,000士兵	800–900空降兵 10,000-130,000 士兵 23 Douglas DC-3s Dutch fighter aircraft and bombers
傷亡與損失
未知	未知

烏鴉行動是1948年12月荷蘭向事實已成立的印度尼西亞共和國發動的一場軍事襲擊。 Operation Kraai (Operation Crow) was a Dutch military offensive against the de facto Republic of Indonesia in December 1948, following the failure of negotiations. With the advantage of surprise, the Dutch managed to capture the Indonesian Republic's temporary capital, Yogyakarta, and seized Indonesian leaders such as de facto Republican President Sukarno. This apparent military success was, however, followed by guerrilla warfare, while the violation of the Renville Agreement ceasefire diplomatically isolated the Dutch. This led to the Dutch–Indonesian Round Table Conference and recognition of the United States of Indonesia.

Referred to by the Dutch as the second politionele actie, it is more commonly known in Indonesian history books and military records as Agresi Militer Belanda II (Second Dutch Military Aggression).

Background

The second Politionele actie or military operation was aimed at conquering Jogjakarta, the then Indonesian capital, and the other areas held by the Republic of Indonesia, except for Aceh. The purpose was to dissolve the Republic of Indonesia and install a more malleable political entity that would join the federal statehood proposed by the Netherlands, thus enabling the Netherlands to preserve its control in Indonesia. In the previous armistice, the Renville Agreementstipulated the withdrawal of Indonesian forces from Dutch-occupied territory in exchange for ending the Dutch naval blockade. The Dutch East Indies government, NICA, accused Indonesians of breaching the armistice that had been signed following Operation Product. a partially correct claim (as Indonesia left behind some of the TNI regulars and militia irregulars under their command) and also partially incorrect as it involves things outside of the Republic's control (which includes : ~4000 irregulars from Hizbullah and Sabilillah militia groups in West Java who refused the treaty, stayed, and splintered into Darul Islam, student troops (Tentara Republik Indonesia Pelajar or TRIP) who still need to finish their study, peasants and other worker militia who still need to works in areas overran by Dutch, and some militia groups who didn't join TNI's command until Renville Agreement). Consequently, Indonesia and third-party observers pointed out that the Dutch not only maintained a naval blockade but also erected new land blockades on their side of the Van Mook Line, which not only limited the movement of people but also food, cloth and medicine; and the Dutch unilaterally pushed ahead with their plan of creating (powerless) ethnic states in their conquered territory when Linggadjati states creation of a new federal state must be agreed by both Dutch and Indonesia. Minor skirmishes continued behind the Dutch side of the Status Quo Line/van Mook Line and intensified as parts of the Siliwangi Division began to infiltrate back after the Madiun affair. In November—December 1948, the Dutch decided on a final military push to crush the Republic.

By September 1948, the Dutch military command had succeeded in decoding the republic's encrypted secret code, gaining crucial intelligence on Indonesian military and diplomatic strategies and plans. This allowed General Simon Hendrik Spoor to counteract republic actions on the battlefield and diplomatic stage. The Dutch were so confident of this advantage that they began organising a press conference in Jakarta explaining their actions three days before the attack was launched, to be held when it commenced. The Dutch also timed their attack to co-ordinate with plans by the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to dispatch a private plane to fly Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta to Bukittinggi in West Sumatra where they would head an emergency government. A Republican delegation led by Sukarno would then be flown to New York City, via New Delhi, to advocate the republic's cause in the United Nations General Assembly. Throughout the Indonesian National Revolution, newly independent India had been sympathetic to the republic's cause, which they viewed as a struggle against Western imperialism. However, as Dutch knew of that plan, they forbade the plane to land in Jakarta.

On 18 December, radio broadcasts in Jakarta reported that the Dutch High Commissioner, Louis Beel, was going to give an important speech the next day. This news did not reach Yogyakarta because the Dutch had cut the communication line. Meanwhile, Spoor instructed to begin a full-scale surprise attack against the Republic. He timed the attack before coinciding with Tentara Nasional Indonesia military exercises on 19 December, giving Dutch movements some temporary camouflage and enabling them to take the enemy by surprise. The attack was also launched without the prior knowledge of the UN Committee of Good Offices.

Battle

First offensive

Dutch troops at Maguwo airfield with captured Indonesian Air Force biplanes in the background, 19 December 1948

The first offensive began in the early hours of 19 December. At 04:30, Dutch aircraft took off from Bandung; heading for Yogyakarta via the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile, the Dutch High Commissioner Beel announced that the Dutch were no longer bound by the Renville Agreement on radio. The operation began as the Dutch attacked major Indonesian centres in Java and Sumatra. At 05:30, Maguwo airfield and the radio station at military aircraft including Yogyakarta were bombed by the Royal Netherlands East Indies Air Force. The republic fielded only three captured Japanese Mitsubishi Zeros whereas the ML-KNIL had several American-built P-40 Kittyhawk and P-51 Mustang fighters, B-25 Mitchell bombers, and 23 Douglas DC-3s carrying approximately 900 troops.

Dutch paratroopers from Korps Speciale Troepen landed at Maguwo airfield, which was defended by 47 lightly armed Indonesian Air Force cadets who lacked anti-aircraft machine guns. In advance, dummies were landed by the Dutch to draw enemy fire which enabled Dutch fighter planes to strafe the defenders. The skirmish lasted for 25 minutes ending with the Dutch taking over Maguwo; killing 128 republicans with no casualties. Having secured the airfield perimeter by 06:45, the Dutch were able to land airborne troops in two successive waves and use Maguwo as an airhead for reinforcements from their main base in Semarang. At 8:30 am, General Spoor gave a radio broadcast ordering his forces to cross the Van Mook line and capture Yogyakarta to "purge" the republic of "unreliable elements".

The main aim of Operation Kraai was to quickly destroy the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) which Spoor thought would desperately defend their capital. Thus, with Dutch superiority both in the air and on land, the Dutch army would easily execute a final and decisive victory over the Indonesian army. However, most of the TNI had left Yogyakarta, defending western Yogyakarta's border from another Dutch military campaign. The commander General Nasution himself was on an inspection tour in East Java. The air attack found the Indonesians unprepared and within hours, the advancing Dutch army had quickly taken the airfield, main road, bridge, and strategic locations. General Sudirman's strategy was to avoid any major contact with the Dutch main army, thus saving the Indonesians from total defeat. He would prefer to lose territory but gain extra time to consolidate his army.

Capture of Yogyakarta

After hearing of the surprise attack, Indonesian military commander General Sudirman broadcast Perintah kilat (quick command) via radios. He also requested Sukarno and other leaders to evacuate and join his guerrilla army. After a cabinet meeting, they refused and decided to stay in Yogyakarta and keep communicating with the United Nations and Komisi Tiga Negara (Trilateral Commission) envoys. Sukarno also announced a plan for "emergency government" in Sumatra, in the event something happened to the Indonesian leadership in Yogyakarta.

Meanwhile, 2,600 fully armed Dutch troops (infantry and paratroopers) led by Colonel Dirk Reinhard Adelbert van Langen had gathered in Maguwo, ready to capture Yogyakarta. On that same day, most of Yogyakarta fell into Dutch hands, with key targets like the air force and chief-of-staff headquarters razed by both Indonesian "scorched earth" tactics and Dutch bombing. Indonesian President Sukarno, Vice-president Mohammad Hatta, and ex-prime minister Sutan Sjahrir were seized by the Dutch and subsequently exiled to Bangka. They let themselves be captured hoping it would outrage international support. However, this action was later criticised among Indonesian military circles which regarded it as an act of cowardice by the political leadership. Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX stayed at his palace in Yogyakarta and did not leave during the entire occupation. The Sultan himself refused to cooperate with the Dutch administration and rejected mediation attempts by the pro-Dutch Sultan of Pontianak Hamid II.

By 20 December, all remaining Republican troops in Yogyakarta had been withdrawn. Offensives were also conducted in other areas in Java and most of Sumatra. All parts of Indonesia except Aceh and some cantons in Sumatra fell under Dutch control. Sudirman, who was suffering from tuberculosis, led the guerrillas from his sickbed. General Abdul Haris Nasution, military commander of Java territories, declared the military government in Java and initiated a new guerrilla tactic called Pertahanan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta (Nation in Arms), transforming the Javan countryside into a guerrilla front with civilian support.

A previously planned emergency government was declared on 19 December, the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia, based in Bukittinggi, West Sumatra, led by Sjafruddin Prawiranegara. Sudirman radioed his immediate support for this government.

事件後果

包括美國在內的各國各大報社對這次襲擊多有報導，刊發社論抨擊荷軍。烏鴉行動發生時，荷蘭已通過馬歇爾計劃獲得十億美元資金用以戰後重建，而美國揚言或中止對荷援助。 為資助東印度軍事行動，荷蘭政府已耗費約五億美元。 美國輿論認為，為了維繫其「老態龍鍾而徒勞無益的帝國主義」，荷蘭不惜挪用馬歇爾資金， 部分共和黨人士、美國教會、非政府組織紛紛開始聲援印度尼西亞獨立。

12月24日，聯合國安理會呼籲雙方停止敵對行動。 1949年1月，安理會通過決議，籲請荷蘭釋放囚犯回日惹，恢復印度尼西亞共和國政府。 荷蘭大部分軍事目標既已實現，遂分別於12月31日與1月5日宣佈在爪哇、蘇門答臘停火。 印尼游擊活動仍未停歇。雙方敵對關係最終隨着5月7日魯姆-范·羅延協議的簽訂而終止。

See also

• Politionele acties
• Rengat massacre

References

Bibliography

• Bertrand, Jacques. Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia. Cambridge University Press. 2004: 166. ISBN 0-521-52441-5. 
• Darusman, Suryono. Singapore and the Indonesian Revolution, 1945–50. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 1992. ISBN 981-3016-17-5. 
• Jason, Robert. Modern Military Aircraft in Combat first. London: Amber Books. 2008. 
• Kahin, George McTurnan; Kahin, Audrey. Southeast Asia: A Testament. London: Routledge Curzon. 2003. ISBN 0-415-29975-6. 
• Pahlefi, Riza. BENGKALIS: NEGERI JELAPANG PADI. CV. DOTPLUS Publisher. 11 August 2022. ISBN 978-623-6428-59-7 （印度尼西亞語）. 
• Ricklefs, M.C. A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1300. San Francisco, CA: Stanford University Press. 1993. 
• Zweers, L. Agressi II: Operatie Kraai. De vergeten beelden van de tweede politionele actie. The Hague, Netherlands: SDU Uitgevers. 1995. （原始內容存檔於8 February 2012）. 
• Operation Kraai (General Spoor) vs Surat Perintah no. 1 (General Sudirman), Gramedia Publisher-Indonesian Language