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关于the intervention since 2015，请见「Russian military intervention in the Syrian civil war」。
A grey world map with Russia and Syria highlighted
Russia (green) and Syria (orange)

Template:Campaignbox Foreign involvement in the Syrian Civil War Template:History of Russia

Russia has supported the administration of incumbent President Bashar al-Assad of Syria since the beginning of the Syrian conflict in 2011: politically, with military aid, and (since September 2015) with direct military involvement. The 2015 deployment to Syria marked the first time since the end of the Cold War in 1991 that Russia entered an armed conflict outside the borders of the former Soviet Union.[1]

From October 2011, Russia, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, repeatedly vetoed Western-sponsored draft resolutions in the UN Security Council that demanded the resignation of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and would thereby open the possibility of United Nations sanctions against his government.[2][3] The Russian leadership rejects the demands of Western powers and their Arab allies that Bashar al-Assad should not be allowed to be a participant in the Syria settlement.[4][5][6] In January and February 2012, the opposition Syrian National Council[7] and the Western powers[8] dismissed Russian peace initiatives.

In September 2015 the Federation Council, (the upper house of Russia's parliament) authorized the Russian president to use armed forces in Syria.[9] Russian air and missile strikes began targeting the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Army of Conquest, al-Nusra Front, and the Free Syrian Army.[6][10] Russia has also provided armament and air support to Turkey. Russian military delivered 5 tons of ammunition and weapons to the People's Defense Units (part of the Syrian Democratic Forces) in Sheikh Maqsoud in their operations against ISIL in Syria.[11][12]

During the course of the Russian intervention, Russia moved beyond bombing just military targets and began bombing hospitals and medical facilities.[13] According to Airwars, between four and six thousand civilians were killed by the Russian Military actions.[14][15] Due to this, Russia's seat at the UN Human Rights Council was taken away in October 2016.[16] A report by Airwars found a 34% increase in incidents of civilian harm caused by Russia during the first six months of 2018 compared to 2017.[15]

Background

History of ties between Syria and Russia

主条目：Russia–Syria relations
Dmitry Medvedev in a joint press conference with the Syrian President following Russo-Syrian talks in May 2010

During the Cold War (1947–1991), Syria was an ally to the Soviet Union in opposition to the Western powers, and a strong political bond grew.[17] Between 1955 and 1958, Syria received about $294 million from the Soviet Union for military and economic assistance.[18] The Suez War in 1956 accelerated a multiplication of ties between Syria and the Soviet Union, simultaneously with the increase in power and influence of the Syrian Ba'ath Party.[19]

The Syrian Revolution of February 1966 gave the Soviet Union the opportunity to further support Syria. In 1971, under an agreement with the Syrian Ba'athist government's President Hafez al-Assad, the Soviet Union was allowed to open its naval military base in Tartus, giving the Soviet Union a stable presence in the Middle East.[20][21] Thousands of Syrian military officers and educated professionals studied in Russia during President Hafez al-Assad's three-decade rule (1971–2000).[22]

In April 1977, Hafez al-Assad visited Moscow, and met with Soviet leaders Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin among others, as a sign of improved Syrian relations with the USSR. Three years later, in October 1980, Syria and the Soviet Union signed a twenty-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.[23]

At the beginning of the Syrian civil war (2011), Syria was one of Russia's closest Middle Eastern allies.

Syrian civil war

参见：Syrian civil war和Vetoed United Nations Security Council resolutions on Syria
Bashar al-Assad, Syrian President since 2000

The Syrian Civil War is an ongoing international armed conflict taking place in Syria.[24] The unrest began in the early spring of 2011 within the context of Arab Spring protests, with nationwide protests against President Bashar al-Assad's government, whose forces responded with violent crackdowns. The civil uprising phase created the platform for the emergence of militant opposition movements and massive defections from the Syrian Army, which gradually transformed the conflict from a civil uprising to an armed rebellion, and later civil war. The rebel Free Syrian Army was created on 29 July 2011 and from then on, the struggle took the shape of an armed insurgency, with civil resistance disbanded and opposition members turning to arms. Many factions arose, either as break-offs of the Free Syrian Army or spontaneously in their own rights.[25]

The killing of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya reportedly left a particularly strong and consequential impression on Putin. A senior diplomat who had served at the U.S. embassy in Moscow under the Obama administration reportedly claimed that "Putin had been appalled by Gaddafi's fate"[26] to the extent that "Putin had watched a video of Gaddafi's savage death three times, a video that shows him being sodomised with a bayonet."[26] Referring to the U.S. coalition's lobbying efforts for the airstrikes at the United Nations, the U.S. diplomat was quoted as saying that a later U.S. intelligence assessment concluded that "Putin blamed himself for letting Gaddafi go, for not playing a strong role behind the scenes" and that the video may have even influenced Putin's decision to support Syrian president Bashar al-Assad since "Putin believed that unless he got engaged Bashar would suffer the same fate – mutilated – and he'd see the destruction of his allies in Syria."[26]

By 2012 it was reported the U.S. was running a covert operation in aid of militant groups fighting the Assad government.[27][28]

On 6 March 2013, the Arab League gave its members the green light to arm the Syrian rebels.[29] On 26 March 2013, at the Arab league summit in Doha, the League recognised the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, as the legitimate representatives of the Syrian people.[30]

Since 2014, a significant part of Syria's territory had been claimed by Islamic State (ISIL), an entity internationally recognised as a terrorist organization; a number of Western and other countries, most notably the U.S., Britain and France, began to participate in direct military action against ISIL in the territory of Syria.

Presumed motives

Military facilities

更多信息：Russia–Syria relations § Russian naval base Tartus和Russian naval facility in Tartus

The Russian naval facility in Tartus in Syria is Russia's only naval facility in the Mediterranean region and only remaining military facility outside the former USSR. In March 2012, critics saw the position of the naval facility in Tartus as a chief motivating factor for Russia to speak out in favor of the Assad government maintaining stability in the region.[需要解释][31][32]

Russian jihadists in Syria

更多信息：Foreign rebel fighters in the Syrian Civil War § Chechnya and Russia

At least since mid 2013, Chechen and other Russian North Caucasus volunteers have been fighting in the Syrian Civil War against the government of Bashar al-Assad.[33] The Washington Post in 2014 reported that Moscow was concerned about such fighters returning to Russia after having picked up militant contacts in Syria.[34]

As of September 2015, an estimated 2,500 Russian nationals were fighting alongside ISIL,[35] and President Putin declared that their return to Russia would be a threat to Russia, and that it would be better to fight them on Syrian ground.[36]

Economic importance and history of arms sales

更多信息：Russia–Syria relations § Economic relations

Russia has been able to showcase its old and new weapons in the conflict which helped boost its arms sales to $15bn in 2015.[37][38]

Russian economic interests in Syria, including arms sales, are offered as one of the reasons for its support of the government. However, according to Foreign Affairs, economic considerations are of less importance than geopolitical ones.[17] This is especially due to the fact that many Syrian arms purchases are financed by loans.[39]

Casualties

主条目：Russian Armed Forces casualties in Syria

Many Russian soldiers have died during the war. Russian officials estimate that as of January 2019, 112 soldiers have been killed since troops were sent to fight in Syria in 2015. The BBC has a higher estimation of 175 deaths having occurred from 2015 to the end of 2018.[來源請求]

In 2019, the Russian Armed Forces were accused of covering up the death one of its soldiers, junior sergeant Andranik Arustamyan. However, Arustamyan's family has defended the military and said that they were informed of his death.[40]

Political efforts and statements

2011

At the end of May 2011, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Russia opposed United Nations' involvement in Syria because "the situation doesn't present a threat to international peace and security ... Syria is a very important country in the Middle East and destabilizing Syria would have repercussions far beyond its borders", and asserted that Assad had made attempts at major reform.[41]

In June, both the US and other Western governments[42] as well as Syrian protesters[43] prevailed upon Russia to change its position, and finally a Syrian anti-government delegation visited Moscow and met with Russian envoy Mikhail Margelov, who after the meeting noted that "leaders come and go" and called for "an end to any and all forms of violence", which some interpreted to be a shift away from Assad, once a major ally, in foreign policy.[44] "A harder line from Russia would be a blow to Syria which relies heavily on Russian military equipment and has long-standing ties to Moscow", the American nbcnews.com wrote that day.[44]

On 19 July, Russian Prime minister, Dmitri Medvedev said he was working with German Chancellor Angela Merkel to find consensus for a strategy to persuade the Syrian government to abandon violence and begin a constructive dialogue with protesters. He did not threaten to use Russia's veto at the United Nations Security Council to oppose a resolution critical of the Syrian government, as Russia has previously said it could do. Medvedev also said it was imperative that Syria not slide into civil war the way Libya did in 2011.[45]

Amid the siege of Hama, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement on 1 August documenting deaths in Hama as well as condemning the violence, including the alleged killing of eight policemen by Assad's government. The statement beseeched the pro-Assad forces as well as the violent protesters to "exercise maximum restraint".[46]

On 3 August, Russian UN ambassador Vitaly Churkin stated that Russia will not oppose a UN resolution condemning the violence in Syria as long as it does not include sanctions or other "pressures".[47] Al Jazeera reported that Russia had "softened the blow" to the Assad government by insisting successfully that the UN would make a statement rather than a resolution on the matter.[48] On 23 August, the Russian delegation to the UN, along with those of China and Cuba, took to the floor to denounce a UN inquiry into human rights violations by the Assad government.[49] Vitaly Churkin stated that "We hope to see progress, we hope to see dialogue established in Syria. ... We think we should continue to work within the scope of that unified position."[50]

On 26 August, Reuters reported that according to UN envoys, the effort by the US, France, the UK, Germany and Portugal to impose UN sanctions on Syria was meeting "fierce resistance" from Russia and China, with Vitaly Churkin threatening to use Russia's veto power.[51] According to Reuters, the arms embargo included in the sanctions would prevent Russian firms (the main source of Syrian weaponry) from selling to Syria.[51] Russia proposed a second "rival" resolution to be voted on, described as "toothless" by Western diplomats, which did not include sanctions or other punitive measures, but rather urged Syria to speed up the process of its reforms.[51]

On 4 October, Russia and China exercised a double veto against a Western-drafted Security Council resolution.[32] The resolution demanded an end to all violence in Syria, accountability for those responsible for it, condemned "grave and systematic" human rights violations, called for a political process, encouraged the opposition to take part in that, and said the Security Council would review Syria's compliance with the resolution in 30 days after which the council would "consider options", including unspecified "measures" under the United Nations Charter.[52][53][54] The New York Times qualified that as "a weak reference to the possibility of sanctions against Damascus", while Russia had said it would not accept a resolution that included even a hint of sanctions. Russia and the other BRICS nations (Brazil, India, China, South Africa) argued that a UNSC resolution on Libya had been twisted to justify the NATO 2011 military intervention in Libya leading into war against the Libyan government and were determined not to repeat that.[52][54] After this veto, an analyst of the Center for the Analysis of Middle East Conflicts said to the BBC Russian service: Assad has a better chance to resist than the opposition does to win, therefore Moscow is now simply betting on Assad.[53]

In the days following their rejecting the Security Council resolution, both Russia and China issued public admonishments of the Syrian government, separately expressing their desire for the government to reform and respect the will of the Syrian people. "If the Syrian leadership is unable to complete such reforms, it will have to go, but this decision should be made not by NATO and certain European countries, it should be made by the people of Syria and the government of Syria," Medvedev told the Russian Security Council.[55]

On 1 November, Sergei Lavrov said at a Russian-Gulf ministerial meeting that Russia would oppose the recent proposal for a no-fly zone in Syria as (in Russia's view) the no-fly zone in Libya had been used to "support one side in a civil war". Lavrov nonetheless stated, when asked if Russia was supporting the Assad government, that "we are not protecting any regime".[54]

On 15 December, Russia proposed a UN Security Council resolution condemning the violence "by all parties, including disproportionate use of force by Syrian authorities". The draft resolution also raised concern over "the illegal supply of weapons to the armed groups in Syria". Western diplomats initially referred to the proposed resolution as a basis for negotiations.[56] The proposal was an updated version of a Russian-Chinese draft resolution introduced to the Security Council a few months earlier.[56]

2012

By the end of January 2012, a resolution proposal, competing with the Russian 15 December draft (see above), had been drafted by Western and Arab powers, which, in contrast, did not condemn violence by both sides in the conflict and did not rule out military intervention. Russia indicated that it would not agree to the Western-Arab draft in its current form,[3] and that it would continue to promote its own resolution in the Security Council.[57] On 4 February 2012, Russia and China vetoed that Western and Arab sponsored Security Council resolution, which urged Bashar al-Assad to adhere to a peace plan drafted by the Arab League.[31][32][58]

On 7 February 2012, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, along with foreign intelligence chief Mikhail Fradkov, met with President Assad and reported to the world that President Assad was committed to reform of the constitution and electoral process. Additionally, the Russian delegation said that Syria alone held the power to change the fate of its people, without foreign intervention.[31] In March, Lavrov said in a televised interview that Syria's leadership had ignored Russia's warnings and made "very many mistakes" that helped drag the country to the brink of civil war.[59]

On 16 April, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov and other Russian diplomats met with members of the Syrian opposition and Hassan Abdul-Azim, head of an opposition group, the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change.[60] When special U.N. envoy Kofi Annan developed a plan to end Syrian violence, Russia attempted to play a major role in the outcome of the plan by meeting with both the Assad government and opposition forces, while vetoing multiple plans during Security Council votes to accomplish the goals set forth by an international consensus.

On 20 April, the Security Council announced an agreement to expand the number of U.N. cease-fire observers in Syria from 30 to 300, as well as to allow Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to decide on the peacekeepers' deployment based on conditions on the ground.[61] Under the plan, Syrian violence would immediately stop and the Assad government would begin implementation of the Annan six-point peace plan.[61] The draft was the result of two texts proposed by Russia and European Council members.[61] When the texts were merged, the portion imposing sanctions on the Assad government for failure to comply with the peacekeeping plan was removed, as requested by Russia and China.[61] The Russian draft also did not contain language dictating that U.N. peacekeepers' presence in Syria was a condition of Assad's agreement to return troops and heavy weapons to their barracks.[61]

The United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) was passed by the U.N. Security Council on 21 April 2012, and deployed up to 300 unarmed observers to Syria for a period of up to 90 days. The plan also called for passage of the Annan peace plan, making unanimous passage of the resolution significant. After the peace plan was passed, Russian's U.N. ambassador Vitaly Churkin relayed Russia's support of the agreement to the media, while other nations expressed frustration with the process and lack of progress in ending the violence so far.[62]

A Bloomberg article (April 2012) said that although Russia has tried to retain the image of a peacemaker in this conflict, Russian diplomats have repeatedly criticized the potential condemnation of Assad by western nations. Russia has also accused the West and allied nations of sabotaging a cease-fire brokered by Russia between Syrian forces.[63]

In the aftermath of the Houla massacre (May 2012), Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that "The government bears the main responsibility for what is going on" and that "Any government in any country bears responsibility for the security of its citizens".[64] Russia's reaction was considered to be a condemnation of the Syrian government.[65] However, Lavrov also stated that the rebels shared the blame for the killings, noting that some victims had been killed at close range in a district controlled by the opposition fighters.[66] As talk of UN intervention intensified, a foreign affairs committee chair in the Russian government, hardened Russia's stance, moving it further away from the earlier condemnation of Damascus, saying that "We have very strong doubts that those people who were shot at point-blank [range] and were stabbed, that this was the action of forces loyal to President Assad. ... The shelling was probably ... the troops of Mr Assad, but the stabbing and point-blank firing was definitely from the other side."[67]

According to Steve Rosenberg of the BBC in June 2012, Russia accused the US of setting double standards: US selling weapons to Bahrain and at the same time criticizing Russia for supporting Syrian President Assad with weapons. Russia feels that the US is acting hypocritically by expecting them to discontinue selling weapons to the Syrian government, since the US supplies Syrian rebels with weapons via Turkey. From Russia's perspective, if US aids the Syrian opposition, they are indirectly, undermining Russia's national security. BBC commented that Russia expects only one of two outcomes to take place in the Syrian civil war: either Assad stays in power, ensuring their stronghold influence in the middle east region, or, radical Islamists take over, creating a terror threat for Russia.[68]

2013

On 11 June 2013, President Vladimir Putin acknowledged that President Assad's not undertaking any "reform" had led to the current situation in Syria. He stated on Russian state media that: "Syria as a country was rife for some kind of change. And the government of Syria should have felt that in due time and should have undertaken some reform. Had they done that, what we're seeing in Syria today would have never happened."[69]

On 26 June 2013, the Deputy Russian Foreign Minister said that the small Russian naval base at Tartus has been evacuated. Mikhail Bogdanov stated that: "Presently, the Russian Defense Ministry has not a single person stationed in Syria. The base does not have any strategic military importance".[70]

On 9 September 2013, responding to U.S. threats of strikes against Syria in response to use of chemical weapons in Syria, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov issued a proposal intended to avert a U.S. attack, with provisions including Syria's placing its chemical weapons under international control and their subsequent destruction.[71]

On 12 September 2013, The New York Times published an op-ed by Vladimir Putin urging the United States to avoid unilateral military action and work with international cooperation in support of a negotiated solution to the Syrian conflict.[72]

2015

September

On 15 September 2015, in Dushanbe at a meeting of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, Putin called for a united, international effort together with Syria to fight the threat of ISIL[73] but also said that Syrian President Assad "is ready to integrate the same [healthy] part of the opposition into the state's administration".[74][75]

On 27 September, President Vladimir Putin stated, in an interview with CBS's '60 Minutes': "More than 2,000 terrorist-fighters from Russia and ex-Soviet republics are in the territory of Syria. There is a threat of their return to us. So, instead of waiting for their return, we are helping President al-Assad fight them".[36]

In the United Nations General Assembly, 28 September 2015, President Putin seemed to lay at least part of the responsibility for the Syrian Civil War with unnamed powers that had been "pushing" for "democratic revolution" in Syria:

... We all know that after the end of the Cold War, a single center of domination emerged in the world. ...

... We are all different. And we should respect that. No one has to conform to a single development model that someone has once and for all recognized as the only right one.

... Attempts to push for changes within other countries based on ideological preferences often led to tragic consequences and to degradation rather than progress. It seems however, that far from learning from others' mistakes, everyone just keeps repeating them. And so the export of revolutions, this time of so-called "democratic" ones, continues. Suffice it to look at the situation in the Middle East and North Africa. ... Instead of the triumph of democracy and progress we got violence, poverty and a social disaster. ... It is now obvious that the power vacuum created in some countries of the Middle East and North Africa led to emergence of anarchy areas. Those immediately started to be filled with extremists and terrorists. Tens of thousands of militants are fighting under the banners of the so-called "Islamic State". ... And now the ranks of radicals are being joined by the members of the so-called "moderate" Syrian opposition supported by the Western countries. First, they are armed and trained, and then they defect to the Islamic State.

... Russia has always been firm and consistent in opposing terrorism in all its forms. Today, we provide military and technical assistance both to Iraq and Syria that are fighting terrorist groups. We think it is an enormous mistake to refuse to cooperate with the Syrian government and its Armed Forces ... We should finally acknowledge that no one but President Assad's Armed Forces and Kurd militia are truly fighting the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations in Syria. ...[4]

Russian and U.S. representatives meet to discuss the situation in Syria on 29 September 2015

Putin again called for cooperation with the Syrian government in fighting terrorism: "we should acknowledge that no-one except for Assad and his militia are truly fighting Isis in Syria."[5]

October

On 1 October 2015, President Vladimir Putin dismissed unidentified media reports of alleged casualties among civilians caused by Russian airstrikes in Syria as "information warfare" against Russia, stating that the claims had begun before the planes used in the airstrikes had even taken off.[來源請求]

On 12 October, Putin appealed to members of the American-led intervention in Syria to join the Russian military intervention in the Syrian Civil War, highlighting the legality of Russia's intervention at Syria's request and questioning whether the U.S. one was valid at all. He highlighted the legitimate authority of Syria's fledgling constitutional democracy and lambasted the scrapped Pentagon program funding rebel training in Syria, saying "It would have been better to give us $500 million. At least we would have used it more effectively from the point of view of fighting international terrorism."[76]

On 13 October, Putin criticized the leaders of the American-led intervention in Syria for sending arms to the area that could end up in the wrong hands. He also criticized the American decision not to share with Russia information regarding potential ISIL targets, adding that American side does not seem to have a clear understanding of what really happens in the country and what goals they are seeking to achieve.[77][78][79]

In mid-October, Russian prime minister Dmitry Medvedev, talking of the U.S. government's refusal to engage in dialogue with Russia on cooperation in Syria, called this a "silly behavior": "As a result of these decisions and the cancellation of talks, the Americans have demonstrated their weakness." He added Russia remained open to discussion of "any issues".[80]

Russian peace initiatives and efforts

参见：Syrian Civil War peace process和U.S.–Russia peace proposals on Syria

On 30 January 2012, the Russian foreign ministry suggested "informal" talks in Moscow between the Syrian regime and opposition, and said the Syrian authorities had already agreed to the Russian offer. Abdel Baset Seda, a member of the Syrian National Council's executive committee, told Reuters that the SNC had not received any formal invitation for such talks, but would decline if one arrived: "Our position has not changed and it is that there is no dialogue with (President Bashar al-Assad)".[7]

According to Martti Ahtisaari who held discussions about Syria with the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council in February 2012, a Russian three-point plan, put forth by its ambassador, Vitaly Churkin included a proposal for Assad to cede power. The plan also required the Syrian government and the opposition to come to the negotiating table. It was ignored by the US, Britain and France, because at the time they thought that Assad's regime was about to fall.[8]

7 November 2013, Russia again announced it was trying to broker talks in Moscow between the Syrian government and opposition, seeing that the U.S. and Russian negotiators failed to agree on whether or not Assad should be forced out of office.[81] Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Bogdanov said the Moscow talks could focus on humanitarian problems as well on some political issues.[81]

At the end of October 2015, on the initiative of Russia, Iran was for the first time invited to participate in the Syria peace talks in Vienna.[82]

On 22 February 2016, in Munich, foreign ministers of Russia and the U.S., as co-chairs of the ISSG,[83] announced that they had concluded a deal to seek a nationwide "cessation of hostilities" in Syria[84] that came into effect on 27 February 2016 at 00:00 (Damascus time).[85]

On 23 February 2016, the Russian defence ministry inaugurated the Russian Reconciliation Center headquartered at its Khmeimim base, which was billed as a step undertaken in accordance with arrangements between Russia and the U.S.[86]

Military support for the Syrian government

Bashar and Asma al-Assad during a visit to Moscow (image taken in 2005)

Military assistance prior to the intervention

From early stages of the Syrian conflict, Russia, under its contractual obligations, delivered ammunition and weapons to the Syrian government;[87] in early 2012 Russia's contracts with Syria for arms were unofficially estimated to be worth 1.5 billion US dollars, comprising 10% of Russia's global arms sales.[87] The arms sales to the Syrian government provoked criticism on the part of Western as well as some Arab nations.[87] The Russian government dismissed criticism noting that the arms sales to Syria did not violate any standing arms embargoes.[87] On 1 June 2012, shortly after the Houla massacre, Russia's foreign ministry in turn blamed the massacre, in which 108 people were said to have been killed, on foreign assistance to Syrian rebels, including arms deliveries and mercenary training: "The tragedy in Houla showed what can be the outcome of financial aid and smuggling of modern weapons to rebels, recruitment of foreign mercenaries and flirting with various sorts of extremists".[88][89]

Besides providing the refurbished MI-25 helicopter gunships, Russia was also said to have transferred to Syria the Buk-M2 air defense system, the Bastion coastal defence missile system, and Yak-130 combat jet trainer.[90] Russian shipments of fuel have also assisted Assad,[91] and an unspecified number of military advisers are teaching Syrians how to use Russian weapons.[92] The head of Russia's federal service for military-technical co-operation confirmed that the repaired Syrian MI-25 attack helicopters were "ready to be delivered on time" adding that "Syria is our friend, and we fulfill all our obligations to our friends".[93] Amnesty International, noting the Syrian government's headlong deployment of military helicopters, criticised Russia: "Anyone supplying attack helicopters – or maintaining, repairing or upgrading them – for the Syrian government displays a wanton disregard for humanity."[94] Human Rights Watch warned Russia's state-owned arms-trading company Rosoboronexport in a letter that, under international law, "providing weapons to Syria while crimes against humanity are being committed may translate into assisting in the commission of those crimes", and called on governments and companies around the world to stop signing new contracts and consider suspending current dealings with the Russian company.[95]

In May 2013, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu traveled to Moscow in a bid to convince Russian president Vladimir Putin not to sell S-300 surface-to-air missile batteries and 144 missiles to Assad's government. The long-range air defense system would be a leap for Syria's current air defense system, enabling them to down fighter planes and cruise missiles.[96]

The Assad government was reported to have used Russian-supplied MI-8 and Mi-17 helicopters to carry out barrel-bomb attacks in Homs. According to former senior American intelligence official Jeffrey White, Russia was most likely providing spare parts such as engines, transmissions and rotors.[97]

In January 2014, a Russian company AR 514 (514 авиационный ремонтный завод) posted photos in their portfolio showing them performing repairs and upgrade on Su-24 identified to belong to Syrian fleet.[來源請求] In 2015 Assad confirmed in an interview that Russia has been supplying arms to Syria based on contracts signed before and after the beginning of the conflict.[98]

Syrian officers and air defence personnel were trained in Russia.[99]

2015–16 intervention and airstrikes

主条目：Russian military intervention in the Syrian Civil War
Barack Obama meets with Vladimir Putin to discuss Syria, 29 September 2015

As of September 2015, Russia has stepped up its military presence in Syria, deploying 12 Su-25 ground attack aircraft, 12 Su-24 interdictor aircraft,[100][101] 6 Sukhoi Su-34 medium bombers[102][103] and 4 Su-30 multirole combat aircraft and 15 helicopters (including Mi-24 attack helicopters)[104] at the Bassel Al-Assad International Airport near Latakia.[105][106][107][108][109] The planes are protected by at least two or possibly three SA-22 surface-to-air, antiaircraft systems, and unarmed MQ-1 Predator-like surveillance drones are being used to fly reconnaissance missions.[106] In addition to air forces, ground forces include 6 T-90 tanks, 15 artillery pieces, 35 armored personnel carriers and 200 Marines (with housing facilities for 1,500 personnel)[110] BM-30 multiple missile launchers have been spotted near Latakia.[來源請求]

On 30 September 2015, Russian President Vladimir Putin requested permission from Federation Council, the upper house of the Russian parliament, to deploy the country's military in Syria.[來源請求] On the same day, Federation Council approved the use of Russian military in Syria to fight terrorist groups, the Islamic State in particular.[來源請求] Permission was granted after a unanimous vote, however any combat operations will be limited to using the air force.[111] Russian media reported that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad had asked for Russia to intervene by providing military assistance.[112]

On 30 September 2015, Russia launched its first airstrikes against targets in Rastan, Talbiseh, and Zafaraniya in Homs province of Syria.[113][114][115][116] Moscow gave the United States a one-hour advance notice of its operations.[117] The Homs area is crucial to President Bashar al-Assad's control of western Syria. Insurgent control of the area would separate the coastal cities of Latakia- where Russian aircraft are based- and Tartous, where Russia operates a naval facility from Damascus.[118]

On 1 October 2015, the Russian defence ministry spokesman said Russia had deployed over 50 aircraft (including also Su-34) in Syria: "The air group was deployed on very short notice. We have been able to do it, as most of the materiel and ammunition had already been there, at our depot in Tartus. We only had to move our aircraft and deliver some equipment."

At the end of December 2015, senior U.S. officials privately admitted that Russia, while maintaining a relatively light military footprint, had achieved its central goal of stabilising the Assad government and, with the costs relatively low and minimal casualties, could sustain the operation at this level for years to come.[119]

Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu with Iranian Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan, 16 February 2016

In February 2016, the Russian Ambassador to Syria said that part of Russia's arms deliveries to the Syrian government was gratis or on easy terms.[120]

In March 2016, the strategic city of Palmyra was recaptured by the Syrian Army after a large-scale offensive supported by Russian airstrikes.[121]

Role of private contractors

Officially, Russia is participating only in an air war over Syria, with a small number of special and support troops on the ground. However, in November 2016 Reuters published a report that contained evidence that Russian forces were playing a more substantial role in ground combat by employing contractors recruited through private agencies registered in foreign jurisdictions. According to the report, despite their unofficial status, these troops operated in coordination with Russia's regular military and were given benefits back home normally available to serving soldiers.[1] Russian contractors fighting in Syria are reportedly paid $6,500 a month.[122]

According to publications by Russian media, Russian contract fighters had taken part in combat in Syria before the formal Russian intervention began in September 2015.[123] According to an official in a Ukrainian law enforcement agency, at least 1,700 Russian contractors have been deployed to Syria, many of whom had earlier served in Ukraine.[122]

Russian nationals fighting for rebel/jihadist groups

In May 2016, Reuters published a Special Report titled "How Russia allowed homegrown radicals to go and fight in Syria" that, based on first-hand accounts, said that at least in the period between 2012 and 2014 the Russian government agencies appeared to run a programme to facilitate and encourage Russian radicals and militants to leave Russia and go to Turkey and then on to Syria; the persons in question had joined jihadist groups, some fighting with the ISIL.[124]

A top leader of ISIL, Abu Omar al-Shishani, initially led a group of several hundred fighters, mostly from ex-Soviet states. In June 2016 Nikolai Bordyuzha estimated that 10,000 militants from ex-Soviet states were fighting alongside jihadist groups in the Middle East, including Syria.[125] In July 2016, the British press cited ″experts″ as believing that ISIL fielded at least three exclusively Russian-speaking "Caucasian" (often led by Chechens) battalions of about 150 men each.[126]

Cooperation attempts with U.S. and UK

The foreign ministers of the US, Russia, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia in Vienna, before a four-way discussion focused on Syria, October 29, 2015

Putin's proposal, mid-October 2015, that the U.S. receive a high-level Russian delegation and that a U.S. delegation arrive in Moscow to discuss coordinated action against terrorism in Syria was declined by both the United States[127] [128] and the United Kingdom.[129][130]

Discussing a long-term political settlement

On 20 October 2015, three weeks into the Russian military campaign in Syria, Russian President Vladimir Putin met Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Moscow to discuss their joint military campaign "against terrorism" and "a long-term settlement, based on a political process that involves all political forces, ethnic and religious groups" in Syria.[131][132]

Reactions

参见：Russian military intervention in the Syrian Civil War § Reactions

Domestic

In May 2012, the Russian Orthodox Church and its primate Patriarch Kirill I were reported by the U.S. mainstream press to be supportive of the existing government in Syria; the Church's leadership alluded to the potential threat to Christians in Syria that had comprised 10% of the country's population.[133]

In September 2015, one of Russia's Muslim (Sunni) leaders, Chief Mufti Talgat Tadzhuddin said: "We fully back the use of a contingent of Russian armed forces in the battle against international terrorism."[134]

In November 2015, Tadzhuddin publicly claimed that he had proposed to Vladimir Putin that Syria be annexed.

In early January 2016, Patriarch Kirill publicly endorsed Russia's military operation in Syria, saying that the campaign in that country that "is literally our neighbour" was "defence of the fatherland".[135][136][137]

In May 2019, The Moscow Times reported that "Fifty-five percent of Russian respondents say their country should end its military campaign in Syria, up from 49 percent in August 2017, according to a poll published by Levada".[138] According to an August 2019 poll by Public Opinion Foundation, only 10% of Russians see the Russian military intervention in the Syrian Civil War as a "success".[139]

Foreign

Vladimir Putin, Hassan Rouhani, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Russia, 2017

In January 2012, Human Rights Watch criticised Russia for "repeating the mistakes of Western governments during the Arab Spring by continuing to support a longstanding authoritarian ally [Assad] whose people have clearly expressed the desire for democratic change".[140] The human rights group also accused Russia of selectively using one of its reports to support a one-sided position on Syria.[141]

Former UK ambassador to Russia from 2004 to 2008, Tony Brenton, said in April 2012 that Russia is looking – in Syria – for its first opportunity since the Cold War to boost its brokering abilities.[63]

In October 2015, Robert Fisk, Middle East correspondent for The Independent, wrote: "The Russian air force in Syria has flown straight into the West's fantasy air space. The Russians, we are now informed, are bombing the "moderates" in Syria – "moderates" whom even the Americans admitted two months ago, no longer existed."[142]

The New York Times opined that with anti-government insurgents in Syria receiving for the first time bountiful supplies of U.S.-made anti-tank missiles and with Russia raising the number of airstrikes against the government's opponents that had raised morale in both camps, broadening war objectives and hardening political positions, the conflict was turning into an all-out proxy war between the U.S. and Russia.[143] This analysis was shared by the Dutch quality newspaper NRC Handelsblad that drew parallels with the situation in Afghanistan in the 1980s.[144] In 2016 Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Seymour Hersh expressed the view that Russia's military campaign against militant groups in Syria was "very good" and more effective than the U.S.-led campaigns, stating "I don't know why we persist on living in the Cold War, but we do. Russia actually did a very good job. They … did the bombing that was more effective than what we do, I think that's fair to say."[145]

  •  美国: The US-led coalition that is launching its own airstrikes against ISIS demanded that Russia stop attacking targets other than ISIS. "We call on the Russian Federation to immediately cease its attacks on the Syrian opposition and civilians and to focus its efforts on fighting ISIL," said the US-led coalition.[146] it also objected to Assad's participation in the intelligence sharing.[147] By the opposition other than ISIS it is meant the groups have received training and weapons from US and other Assad's enemies.[146] "We do not support the presence of Syrian government officials who are part of a regime that has brutalized its own citizens," said Col. Steven H. Warren, the spokesman for the US-led coalition.[147]
  • Template:Country data Britain: "They are backing the butcher Assad, which is a terrible mistake, for them and the world," said British Prime Minister David Cameron.[146][148]

See also

References

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  125. ^ Ex-Soviet exiles give Islamic State violence a Russian accent. Reuters. 4 July 2016 [7 December 2017]. （原始内容存档于9 October 2016）. 
  126. ^ 'Your son has become a martyr': the Russian fighters from Dagestan rising up the ranks of Islamic State 互联网档案馆的存檔，存档日期15 April 2019. The Telegraph, 30 July 2017.
  127. ^ Russia's Lavrov says Washington declines deeper military talks on Syria. NEWSru. 14 October 2015 [17 October 2015]. （原始内容存档于8 December 2015）. 
  128. ^ "Это обидно": Лавров сообщил, что США отказались принять делегацию РФ для обсуждения сирийского кризиса. NEWSru. 14 October 2015 [16 October 2015]. （原始内容存档于15 October 2015）. 
  129. ^ Parfitt, Tom. Britain has frozen us out, says Russian envoy. The Times. 26 October 2015 [26 October 2015]. （原始内容存档于28 October 2015）. 
  130. ^ Российский посол в Лондоне обвинил Британию в замораживании дипломатических контактов с РФ 互联网档案馆的存檔，存档日期24 April 2019. NEWSru, 26 October 2015.
  131. ^ Assad Makes Unannounced Trip to Moscow to Discuss Syria With Putin. The New York Times. 21 October 2015 [27 October 2015]. （原始内容存档于26 October 2015）. 
  132. ^ Meeting with President of Syria Bashar Assad. President of Russia. 21 October 2015 [23 October 2015]. （原始内容存档于21 October 2015）. 
  133. ^ Barry, Ellen. Russian Church Is a Strong Voice Opposing Intervention in Syria. The New York Times. 31 May 2012 [11 October 2015]. （原始内容存档于15 October 2015）. 
  134. ^ Church Says Russia Fighting 'Holy Battle' in Syria. Yahoo! News. 30 September 2015 [29 March 2021]. 
  135. ^ Патриарх Кирилл поддержал военную операцию России в Сирии. Interfax. 7 January 2016 [9 January 2016]. （原始内容存档于9 January 2016）. 
  136. ^ Патриарх Кирилл: военные действия РФ в Сирии – это и есть защита Отечества. [9 January 2016]. （原始内容存档于10 January 2016）. 
  137. ^ Рождественское интервью Святейшего Патриарха Кирилла телеканалу "Россия" / Патриарх / Патриархия.ru. [9 January 2016]. （原始内容存档于14 January 2016）. 
  138. ^ Fewer Than Half of Russians Support Syria Campaign, Poll Says. The Moscow Times. 6 May 2019 [9 May 2019]. （原始内容存档于8 May 2019）. 
  139. ^ The pandemic may change Russia's calculus in the Middle East. Al Jazeera. 13 April 2020. 
  140. ^ Russia Repeats Western Mistakes in Arab Spring. Human Rights Watch. 23 January 2012 [11 October 2015]. （原始内容存档于6 October 2015）. 
  141. ^ Russia: Selective Use of Syria Findings. Human Rights Watch. 23 March 2012 [30 June 2012]. （原始内容存档于7 June 2012）. 
  142. ^ Fisk, Robert. Syria's 'moderates' have disappeared ... and there are no good guys. The Independent. 4 October 2015 [8 October 2015]. （原始内容存档于8 October 2015）. 
  143. ^ U.S. Weaponry Is Turning Syria into Proxy War With Russia. The New York Times. 12 October 2015 [14 October 2015]. （原始内容存档于13 October 2015）. 
  144. ^ In Syrië dreigt nu een proxy-oorlog: Rusland vs Amerika VS leveren extra wapens aan rebellen die vechten tegen Assad, lees: Moskou. Terug naar jaren 80 in Afghanistan. 互联网档案馆的存檔，存档日期3 February 2016. NRC Handelsblad, 14 October 2015 ("In Syria, a proxy-war now is looming").
  145. ^ Klippenstein, Ken. Exclusive Interview: Seymour Hersh Dishes on Saudi Oil Money Bribes and the Killing of Osama Bin Laden. 20 April 2016 [4 May 2016]. （原始内容存档于2 May 2016） –通过AlterNet. 
  146. ^ 146.0 146.1 146.2 US, allies ask Russia to halt strikes outside IS areas in Syria. REUTERS. 3 October 2015 [3 October 2015]. （原始内容存档于4 October 2015）. 
  147. ^ 147.0 147.1 Gordon, Michael R. Russia Surprises U.S. With Accord on Battling ISIS. The New York Times. 27 September 2015 [28 February 2017]. （原始内容存档于9 July 2017）. 
  148. ^ Cameron condemns Russia's military action in Syria as 'terrible mistake' – video. The Guardian. 4 October 2015 [22 October 2015]. （原始内容存档于18 January 2016）. 

Further reading

Template:Syrian Civil War Template:Vladimir Putin Template:Syria topics Template:Russia topics

背景

自 18 世纪初以来，奥地利和俄罗斯对奥斯曼帝国北部边境施加压力，导致奥斯曼叙利亚各阿拉伯省份的地方长官们开始反抗统治。[1] 1768 年，当俄罗斯帝国正在奥斯曼帝国边境附近镇压波兰起义时，一个哥萨克军团追赶一些叛乱分子越过边境，并在巴尔塔镇进行了大屠杀。[2] 苏丹最终作出回应，向俄罗斯宣战。[3] 他向马穆鲁克王朝的阿里贝伊寻求军事援助，阿里贝伊是当时奥斯曼帝国埃及最有权势的官员。阿里密切关注着战争的进程，并于 1769 年派遣所需的 3,000 名士兵前往援助奥斯曼帝国。然而，次年年初，他宣布埃及独立，主要是为了回应与俄罗斯的战争。后来，他与巴勒斯坦北部富有的阿拉伯统治者查希尔·奥马尔结盟。阿里和查希尔在反对伊斯兰原教旨主义、反对苏丹对欧洲的孤立主义政策以及禁止奥斯曼帝国政要进入其宫廷等方面有着共同的立场。[4]

伊凡·艾瓦佐夫斯基的《切什梅夜战》 （1848 年)[n 1]

与此同时，由于俄罗斯在黑海缺乏一支有组织的舰队，叶卡捷琳娜大帝与伯爵阿列克谢·格里戈里耶维奇·奥尔洛夫制定了计划，从波罗的海舰队中抽调大量舰船，部署到地中海。[5] 俄罗斯希望他们从背后袭击土耳其海峡，并希望其在爱琴海的海军存在能激起希腊的叛乱。[1] 这支新组建的地中海舰队由奥尔洛夫率领，海军上将格里戈里·斯皮里多夫指挥，于 9 月从哥本哈根启航。 23，1769。到三月 1770年12月1日，第一支支队停泊在摩里亚南部海域，奥尔洛夫起义就在此爆发。随后几个月，该地区不同地点遭到轰炸和部队登陆。[6] 七月 7 一支土耳其舰队在切斯马海战中被击溃，奥斯曼帝国海军陷入瘫痪，使得俄罗斯海军在战争的剩余时间里掌控了地中海的海军指挥权。幸存的土耳其船只撤退至达达尼尔海峡。海军少将约翰·埃尔芬斯通提议直接攻击君士坦丁堡，但奥尔洛夫说服他用舰队封锁海峡，而舰队的其他部分则在爱琴海北部发动攻势。[7]

自 15 世纪以来，俄罗斯编年史就将穆斯林描述为哈加利人。这是一个贬义词，暗示他们是被流放到西奈沙漠的圣经夏甲的后裔。俄罗斯宫廷知道奥斯曼帝国的突尼斯、阿尔及利亚和的黎波里塔尼亚在 18 世纪已经实现自治。[8] 尽管凯瑟琳对穆斯林持负面看法，但还是毫不犹豫地将他们视为潜在的盟友。 1769 年 7 月 15 日，她指示斯皮里多夫除非受到挑衅，否则不要攻击上述国家的船只，并促使他试图让巴巴里国家反抗他们的奥斯曼帝国霸主。由于突尼斯和阿尔及利亚站在奥斯曼帝国一边作战，叶卡捷琳娜的计划未能实现，而的黎波里的阿里帕夏与奥尔洛夫的通信也没有取得重大成果。[9]

1770 年末，阿里贝伊派遣 40,000 人的军队前往巴勒斯坦，由他信任的将军穆罕默德贝伊阿布扎哈卜指挥。1771 年春，这支军队与查希尔的军队会合，并占领了黎凡特的几座城镇。然而，六月初大马士革陷落后不久，奥斯曼帝国特工就成功说服阿布·扎哈卜反对阿里贝伊，并承诺任命他为埃及统治者，而不是他的霸主。阿布·扎哈卜率军撤退，并与他的前主人卷入了争夺埃及控制权的权力斗争。而扎希尔则在自己的酋长国中陷入孤立，不得不独自面对奥斯曼帝国不可避免的反攻。[10] 阿里贝伊当时确信，通过与俄罗斯结盟，他可以扭转最近的挫折。十二月 1771 年 2 月 2 日，他派遣一名名叫雅库布的亚美尼亚特使到爱琴海帕罗斯岛的地中海舰队总部与奥尔洛夫会面，并向俄罗斯人提出结盟。[11]

这一提议后来被沙皇皇后接受，但她是在阿里贝伊不再统治埃及之后才得知这一联盟的。[n 2] 当他与阿布·扎哈卜之间的对峙最终升级为武装冲突时，他被迫离开该国并向盟友查希尔寻求庇护。[13] 在不知道阿里逃走的情况下，奥尔洛夫命令与阿里取得联系，由希腊副官里佐指挥的一支支队启航前往达米埃塔，但在得知阿里的命运后很快就离开了港口。中队随后沿着巴勒斯坦海岸搜寻他，并最终于 6 月在阿克里找到了他。 3.里佐随后派遣一支支队前往北方，在贝鲁特附近的提尔拦截了一艘奥斯曼护卫舰。与此同时，在西顿，查希尔的 6,000 名小军队正遭到包括德鲁兹人在内的 30,000 名奥斯曼帝国军队的围攻。里佐的舰船加入了驻军，炮击了奥斯曼帝国的袭击者，袭击者随后不久撤退。[14]

首次职业

First bombardment of Beirut
日期18 June 1772 – 23 June 1772
地点
Beirut
结果 Occupation of the town until 28 June
参战方
Imperial Russian Navy Druze garrison

新组建的联盟希望利用奥斯曼帝国在西顿的挫折，决定将俄罗斯舰队派遣到当时由德鲁兹人控制的小港口城市贝鲁特。根据研究员威廉·珀森 (William Persen) 的说法，这次远征的目的既是让德鲁兹人陷入困境，又是为了惩罚他们站在土耳其政府一边。封锁他们的港口就可以实现这一目标。贝鲁特也是该地区唯一一个至今仍受奥斯曼帝国统治的港口。[15]

里佐的舰队很可能不知道俄罗斯和波特最近达成了停战协议，于 6 月出现在该镇海岸附近。 18 与泰尔和阿卡支队重新会合后。这支部队由两艘护卫舰组成， Sv.尼古拉和Sv。帕维尔，四艘波拉卡帆船，五艘半帆船和四艘三桅帆船。该船运送的是一支主要由希腊和阿尔巴尼亚雇佣兵组成的步兵师。同一天，奥斯曼帝国开始炮击该镇，停靠在港口的船只全部被击沉。[16] 《叶卡捷琳娜二世和东方》一书的作者奥里昂在他的版本中写道，里佐向贝鲁特保卫者发出了 24 小时最后通牒，要求他们悬挂俄罗斯国旗并表示敬意。海军攻势持续了五天，其中六月登陆部队的进攻未成功 21.经过两天的猛烈轰炸，他们终于在六月登陆。 23并花了数小时洗劫该镇及其集市。劫掠所得总额约为 550,000基尔什，包括贸易商品和现金。[n 3] 俄国人于 6 月离开 28 日，他从统治周围山区的德鲁兹埃米尔尤素夫·希哈布那里得到了额外的报酬。希哈布还同意与联盟建立为期四个月的联盟关系。[18]

阿里贝伊起义结束

俄国人撤离后，奥斯曼帝国将贝鲁特割让给尤素夫·希哈布的黎巴嫩山酋长国。而希哈布则任命曾在阿里贝伊手下服役的艾哈迈德贝伊贾扎尔负责该镇的保卫。[19] 当阿里在阿克里与他的盟友轰炸贝鲁特时，他接见了他的使者雅各布。他乘坐一艘俄罗斯护卫舰前来，带着叶卡捷琳娜的礼物和友好口信。叶卡捷琳娜在口信中向他保证，她将致力于俄罗斯与埃及统治者的联盟。然而，阿里对这一姿态并不满意，他寻求俄罗斯以步兵、炮兵和海军支援的形式提供军事援助，以从阿布·扎哈卜手中夺回埃及。他派遣一位新使者带着此信息去见奥洛夫。根据历史学家爱德华·洛克罗伊 (Édouard Lockroy) 的说法，他可能还向俄罗斯人提供了对耶路撒冷基督教圣地的控制权。[20]

奥尔洛夫回应阿里，他受与土耳其政府的停战协议的约束。他承诺派遣一支由俄罗斯军官和炮兵组成的小型部队，并承诺一旦情况允许，将向阿里提供他所需要的一切援助。夏季，阿里和扎希尔的军队围攻了雅法城。 9 月，一艘俄罗斯运输船加入了围攻，并在该城市附近投放了火炮。一个月后，这艘船起航，向奥洛夫带来了新的恳求。[20] 另一支俄罗斯海军支队在中尉帕纳奥蒂·阿莱克西亚诺（[21] Alexiano）的指挥下于11月抵达雅法，再次加入炮击，并告知阿里奥尔洛夫计划为他的事业组建一支大型舰队。阿莱克西亚诺的舰队由护卫舰Sv.组成。保罗和一些波拉卡人，此前还在达米埃塔附近摧毁了两艘巴巴里船只，并俘获了一些较小的船只。[22]

关于阿布·扎哈卜阵营中不服从命令的谣言和埃及日益增长的异议引起了阿里的注意。他变得不耐烦了，1773 年 4 月，他率领一支小部队前往埃及，尽管一个月前他就已得到俄罗斯援助将很快抵达的保证。阿里的军队在开罗附近被对手的军队击败。他被捕并在几天后死亡，可能是因中毒而死。[20] 与此同时，贾扎尔已加强了贝鲁特的防御并选择独立于谢哈布行事，宣称他只承认苏丹对该镇的权威。奥尔洛夫承诺的舰队由米哈伊尔·加夫里洛维奇·科朱霍夫上校指挥[23]，于 6 月抵达阿克。听闻阿里的死讯后，科朱霍夫同意与查希尔签订一份“友好条约”。[24]

第二职业

7 月，科朱霍夫率领他的舰队（至少有 222 门火炮）出现在贝鲁特海岸附近 6号，搭载1200名阿尔巴尼亚雇佣兵和机动炮兵部队。当大马士革帕夏拒绝向希哈布提供对抗贾扎尔的援助时，查希尔已经与希哈布达成了结盟协议。在随后长达一个月的谈判中，德鲁兹埃米尔成功通过查希尔和他的叔叔阿米尔·穆萨·曼苏尔说服科朱霍夫将贝鲁特交给他。希哈布将缴纳30万基尔什的贡金，并将该镇置于俄罗斯的保护之下。科朱霍夫则承诺，他的军队不会像 1772 年的俄国占领者那样掠夺该镇。双方同意，俄罗斯将扣留曼苏尔作为人质，直到谢哈布全额付款。[25]

战斗序列

当科朱霍夫的舰队抵达贝鲁特时，其舰队由下列舰只组成:[26]

船 类型 枪支
纳德日达（科祖霍夫） 护卫舰 三十二
Sv。帕维尔 护卫舰 二十六
Sv。尼古拉 护卫舰 二十六
纳克西亚 护卫舰 22
斯拉瓦 护卫舰 16
Sv。阿列克西 波拉卡 20
Sv。安娜 波拉卡 20
Sv。叶卡捷琳娜 波拉卡 18
斯尼克斯 波拉卡 12
扎比亚卡 大篷车 18
六艘半帆船
Second bombardment of Beirut
日期2 August 1773 – 10 October 1773
地点
Beirut
结果 Occupation of the town until late January or early February 1774
参战方
Imperial Russian Navy
Shihab's forces
Zahir's forces		 Jazzar's garrison

轰炸开始于八月 2日，轰炸持续了一整天，摧毁了港口区域及其塔楼。[27] 据该市的法国领事称，噪音非常大，甚至距离约 25 英里（40 公里）的西顿都能听到。阿拉伯消息来源称，甚至在大马士革都能听到这声音。[28]贝鲁特大部分地区被毁，但贾扎尔拒绝投降。科朱霍夫命令部队和炮兵登陆并发动地面攻击。城墙多处被攻破，但希哈布拒绝派遣军队进攻该镇，理由是协议规定科朱霍夫必须将该镇交给德鲁兹人，并支付报酬。科朱霍夫选择维持海陆封锁，切断该镇的粮食供应。[29] 希哈布和扎希尔的军队击溃了由的黎波里帕夏指挥的从贝卡进军的奥斯曼救援军。[28]

贾扎尔于九月底开始与袭击者进行谈判。由于担心向谢哈布或科朱霍夫投降最终会导致自己被处决，他提出向扎希尔投降，并在他的指挥下服役。[30] 贾扎尔于十月投降贝鲁特 10日,[26]他率领800名马格里布驻军前往阿卡。[31] 到进攻结束时，俄军共有 34 人阵亡，96 人受伤。根据他与谢哈布的安排，科朱霍夫在停靠后只夺取了两艘半帆船和一些武器。当后者无法向俄罗斯人支付承诺的全部金额时，科朱霍夫威胁要杀死他的德鲁兹人质曼苏尔。希哈布设法支付了部分款项，科朱霍夫接受了，但需支付余额。俄国指挥官和他的舰队启程前往爱琴海，留下 300 名阿尔巴尼亚雇佣兵看守被软禁的曼苏尔，并以占领者的身份留在城里。[32]

阿尔巴尼亚人占领贝鲁特直到 1774 年 1 月底或 2 月初,[32] 但尚不清楚他们是否收到了应付的余额。[n 4] 根据来自西顿的法国领事馆的报告，占领者在贝鲁特上空悬挂着俄罗斯国旗，并在该城正门上悬挂了叶卡捷琳娜大帝的巨幅画像，迫使游客向其致敬。[29]

后果和遗产

1788 年印刷的《群岛地图集》中的贝鲁特地图

贝鲁特投降后不久，贾扎尔和他的马格里布雇佣兵就从查希尔的营地叛逃到奥斯曼帝国。[31] 随着 1774 年初俄国人的撤离以及同年《库楚克开纳尔卡条约》的签署，查希尔不得不独自面对土耳其政府的报复。俄土和平条约允许俄罗斯在地中海的任何地方设立领事馆，开辟与中东的贸易路线，并保障圣地基督教朝圣者的安全，但并未提及查希尔或俄罗斯在战时在该地区获得的领土。[33]1775 年 8 月，查希尔在由埃及的阿布·扎哈卜率领的奥斯曼军队围攻阿克里期间被杀。由于希哈布从未直接反抗奥斯曼帝国，他很快就得到了奥斯曼帝国的赦免。但由于贾扎尔 (Jazzar) 的重税，他于 1776 年被迫放弃贝鲁特。贾扎尔当时刚被奥斯曼帝国政府任命为西顿帕夏。[34]

这是阿拉伯城市首次受到俄罗斯统治，也是自两个半世纪前奥斯曼帝国征服该地区以来，贝鲁特首次脱离奥斯曼帝国的控制。[35] 1773 年，“Place des Canons”（“大炮广场”）成为如今贝鲁特中心区烈士广场的通用名称。尽管是非官方的，但这个名字一直使用到 20 世纪 50 年代。它指的是俄罗斯人在广场上部署的大型火炮，当时广场是城墙东边的一片空地，被称为 Bourj。[36]

这项短暂的占领的重要性仍然是对其进行分析的相对较少的历史学家和学者争论的话题。威廉·珀森 (William Persen) 在 1952 年对这一事件的评估中，淡化了占领的重要性，只是将其描述为“西方渗透中东的新力量”。[35] 另一方面，P·珀米诺夫 (P. Perminov) 等苏联学者则将其描述为现代冷战时期苏联向第三世界国家民族解放运动提供援助的早期表现。[35]

笔记

  1. ^ Çeşme is sometimes spelled "Chesma" or "Chesme".
  2. ^ By the time Yaqub reached Paros, Orlov had been gone for four days on a mission to Livorno. Spiridov, who had been in charge there, told Ali's envoy that he was not at liberty to form an alliance. Yaqub then sailed to Livorno, where he met Orlov, after which he travelled all the way to Saint Petersburg to pass the message to Catherine herself.[12]
  3. ^ According to Lusignan, a certain Amir Mahamut was appointed by the Greek captain Anton Psaro, as governor of Beirut, in response to calls by members of the local Greek Orthodox community for greater protection in the face of their Druze overlords. Lusignan, however, also designates April as the month in which the events take place, contradicting other accounts of this occupation.[17]
  4. ^ Some Arab chroniclers, such as Tannus al-Shidyaq, wrote that the Russians were fully repaid. On the other hand, Paul Masson, author of Histoire du commerce français dans le Levant au XVIIIe siècle, wrote that "100 purses" were never paid.[29]

参考

  1. ^ 1.0 1.1 Persen 1955，第276頁.
  2. ^ Sicker 2001，第69–70頁.
  3. ^ Gallant 2015，第18頁.
  4. ^ Persen 1955，第277–278頁; Smilianskaya, Velizhev & Smilianskaya 2011，第346–347頁
  5. ^ Anderson 1952，第278頁.
  6. ^ Anderson 1952，第282頁; Gallant 2015，第18–19頁.
  7. ^ Persen 1955，第276頁; Anderson 1952，第291頁.
  8. ^ Smilianskaya, Velizhev & Smilianskaya 2011，第333–334頁.
  9. ^ Smilianskaya, Velizhev & Smilianskaya 2011，第334–336頁.
  10. ^ du Quenoy 2014，第131–132頁; Persen 1955，第278頁.
  11. ^ Persen 1955，第279頁.
  12. ^ du Quenoy 2014，第132頁.
  13. ^ du Quenoy 2014，第133頁.
  14. ^ Persen 1955，第279–280頁; Anderson 1952，第298頁.
  15. ^ du Quenoy 2014，第133–134頁; Persen 1955，第280頁.
  16. ^ du Quenoy 2014，第133–134頁; Anderson 1952，第298頁.
  17. ^ Persen 1955，第280頁.
  18. ^ Persen 1955，第280–281頁.
  19. ^ du Quenoy 2014，第135頁.
  20. ^ 20.0 20.1 20.2 Persen 1955，第281頁.
  21. ^ Mariti 1774，第121頁.
  22. ^ Persen 1955，第281頁; Anderson 1952，第300頁.
  23. ^ Solov'ev 1991，第102, endnote at p. 287頁
  24. ^ du Quenoy 2014，第135–136頁.
  25. ^ Persen 1955，第281–282頁; Harris & Harris 2014，第122頁.
  26. ^ 26.0 26.1 Anderson 1952，第302頁.
  27. ^ Persen 1955，第282–283頁.
  28. ^ 28.0 28.1 du Quenoy 2014，第136頁.
  29. ^ 29.0 29.1 29.2 Persen 1955，第283頁.
  30. ^ du Quenoy 2014，第136–137頁.
  31. ^ 31.0 31.1 Philipp 2001，第138頁.
  32. ^ 32.0 32.1 du Quenoy 2014，第137頁.
  33. ^ Persen 1955，第283–284頁; du Quenoy 2014，第139頁.
  34. ^ du Quenoy 2014，第138頁; Philipp 2001，第43–44頁.
  35. ^ 35.0 35.1 35.2 du Quenoy 2014，第129頁.
  36. ^ Khalaf 2013，paragraph starting "The first definitive change in its public identity ..."; du Quenoy 2014，第137頁.

来源

进一步阅读

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